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Underbanking, or use of alternative financial services such as payday lenders
rather than traditional banks, is a practice that has substantial financial and social harm.
Given that literature and prior research shows that immigrants face unique cultural
barriers to financial assimilation, the current study examines how immigrant status
influences one’s odds of being underbanked. Using the June 2015 Underbanking
Supplement to the Current Population Survey, immigrants are delineated by first- and
second-generation status, as well by the development status of their country of origin, and
their relationship to underbanking is examined through a series of logistic regression
analyses. Results indicate that first-generation immigrants from developing countries
continue to face substantial barriers to full financial assimilation, while those from
developed countries share similar outcomes as citizens. Second-generation immigrants
whose parents are from developing countries, however, have lower odds to be
underbanked, showing that generational progress is occurring. Implications of this
analyses are that future research should not assume immigrants all share one monolithic
experience in the context of economic integration.
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Introduction
It has long been understood by the sociological discipline (and others) that microand macroeconomics play a significant role in the formation and execution of society. At
every level, from countries engaging in international trade to the individual who works
for less than a living wage, economics has, both historically and presently, provided a key
space for rich investigations into the ways in which people interact with each other
through societal organizations and structures. However, the implications of the
relationships between banks, which serve as the hubs of economic interaction at the
microeconomic level, and individuals are largely unexplored from a sociological
perspective. This is troubling, due to the recurring trend of a break down in that
relationship, leading to massive, negative economic implications on those individuals
whose lose their relationships with their banks and instead operate through alternative
financial services (AFS), such as check-cashing centers, payday lenders, and pawn shops
(Rhine & Greene, 2012; Northwood & Rhine, 2016). This trend, known as underbanking,
is the focus of the study.
Even less attention is paid to the influence of an underbanking trend within the
American immigrant population. It is an unfortunate reality that, in the United States,
immigration status and poverty often go hand-in-hand (Pauwels, 2011; Stookey, 2010).
Immigrants, regardless of being documented or undocumented, are a financially
vulnerable population, often subject to less-than-adequate or even harmful financial
infrastructure outside of traditional, brick-and-mortar bank locations (Pauwels, 2011).
Immigrant populations may feel they are unable to use actual banks for a variety of
reasons, such as language barriers, cultural barriers, financial illiteracy with the U.S.
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banking system, or, for those who are undocumented, fear that engaging with banks will
make them easier to identify by the government (Pauwels). As a result, underbanking is
particularly severe among immigrant populations (Pauwels, 2011; Stookey, 2010).
However, research concerning correlations between particular elements of immigrant
status, namely second-generation immigrants and countries of origin, has largely gone
unexplored thus far. The current study seeks to expand our understanding of this problem
by examining the relationships between immigration status and underbanking severity
using data from the June 2015 FDIC supplement to the Current Population Study.

Literature Review
What is Underbanking?
Before an in-depth discussion of the general body of literature surrounding
underbanking, it is appropriate to briefly discuss how underbanking is currently defined.
The U.S. Council of Economic Advisers defines underbanking as being reliant on
alternative financial services, such as payday lenders, check cashing businesses, and
pawn shops, due to a lack of access to traditional banking infrastructure (Council of
Economic Advisers, 2016). This lack of access can stem from many causes, such as a
lack of nearby bank locations, inconvenient banking hours, or a general distrust of the
banking system (Rhine & Greene, 2012). However, a better definition might be one that
leaves out any attempt to identify cause. The U.S. FDIC’s definition of underbanking
(which will be used for this study), for example, explains the phenomenon as when one
has used alternative financial services, such as payday loans, auto title loans, or pawn
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shops, within the last 12 months (Burhouse et al, 2016). Additionally, the FDIC draws a
distinction between being underbanked and unbanked, which they explain as not having a
checking or savings account with a bank. (To clarify any residual confusion, all unbanked
people are also underbanked, because they must engage in financial exchange outside
banks. Underbanked people may have an account, but do not always use it for the
average financial exchange. For example, someone might have a bank account, but due to
inconvenient bank hours, be forced to use a check-cashing service to access their
paycheck.) While the FDIC definition is indelicate in other ways, as will be discussed
later, it better suits the purpose of this study. Additionally, it should be noted that
underbanked households, as opposed to individuals, are defined as when neither the head
of household nor their partner has the relevant account access (Gross et al, 2012).

The General State of Underbanking Research
While underbanking is a relatively new term to economic sociology (Google
Scholar only returns 66 entries for the term “underbanking,” most of which are about
racing tracks or aviation models, which use underbanking in a geometrical sense), studies
about the effects and implications of the relationship between banking infrastructure and
financial exclusion/inclusion have been around for decades in economics (Seaver &
Fraser, 1979). Specifically, it was recognized that branch banking was a preferable model
of banking, because it supposedly brought more bank locations to more consumers,
allowing for a fuller integration into the economy. Thus, while the term might be a new
addition to our sociological lexicon, one should not assume that no attention has been
paid to this aspect of microeconomics before now, albeit sometimes under other names,
such as “fringe banking,” which is a common term in economics.
3

However, a general misconception about underbanking brought forward by
Seaver & Fraser, and the previously mentioned definition, is that geographic access to a
bank is the main causal factor concerning whether someone is underbanked. In reality,
the core causes of underbanking are hard to identify, as research has shown a large
variety of reasons why underbanking occurs. For example, we know that underbanking
can be the result of a simple lack of locally accessible banking infrastructure (Rhine &
Greene, 2012). In fact, “bank deserts,” areas where no banking infrastructure exists, have
become increasingly common since 2008, and happens in mostly low-income and racial
minority neighborhoods (Amel & Prager, 2014). Yet proximity to banks does not ensure
that people are banked, as people may also be excluded due to financial illiteracy,
mistrust of the financial system, or even banking policies meant to exclude those
individuals whom banks find less profitable (Rhine & Greene, 2012). There is also
research that suggests that AFS locations occur in higher frequency around traditional
banking locations, and we would expect the opposite to be true if simply having a bank
nearby meant people would choose to bank there (Lee, Gainey, & Triplett, 2013). Thus,
narrow focus on solely the geographic distribution of bank branches as a cause of
underbanking is at best misguided, and at worst, counterproductive.
All of this is not to say that access to a physical bank location is not important to
consider or that it should be ignored as a factor. Indeed, research suggests physical
locations are an important aspect to banking and that their importance may even serve as
a limiting factor on other forms of banking, such as mobile or online banking (Hegerty,
2015). Hegerty’s analysis shows that, while online forms of banking are on the rise, there
are still certain elements of banking that most people are simply too unfamiliar with to do
4

without assistance, or too uncomfortable with to do online. Additionally, in the poorer
and less white neighborhoods, where AFS tends to aggregate, internet access tends to be
less universal, meaning that a physical bank branch location could still be important to
service customers who cannot access more modern forms of traditional banking. For
example, due to the prevalence of smart phones and digital business, mobile banking
creates access to banking services in ways that are not tied to any physical infrastructure
(Karp & Nash-Stacey, 2015). However, as Hegerty notes, it is precisely the areas that are
the least likely to be able to afford smart phones and secure internet access that are also
the least likely to have banks.
While declining bank locations may not be the lynchpin on their own, it should be
discussed that AFS locations have greatly increased since the 1990’s (Lee, Gainey, &
Triplett, 2013). There are more payday lending locations in this country than there are
Starbucks, and in most states, more than there are McDonald’s (Center for Responsible
Lending, 2009). This is due largely to the exceptions to certain financial regulations
granted to AFS industries during that period, which greatly reduced their oversight and
allowed them to flourish (Lee, Gainey, & Triplett, 2013). While some states have started
to implement new regulations, which has stabilized the growth of AFS in those regions,
most states have not yet taken such action, and in those states, the number of AFS
locations continues to climb. AFS, particularly payday lenders, also increasingly operate
online, allowing them access to a wider market and a path around regulations that would
otherwise limit or even prevent their predatory practices (Caplan, 2014). To make the
problem worse, many companies and stores that were not originally designed to offer
such services, such as Wal-Mart and the gas station chain Seven Eleven, now offer them
5

as well. AFS have no “deserts”; they are available everywhere, nationwide. It should also
be remembered that the poor often have limited choice concerning how, when, and where
they engage in financial interactions, making AFS the worst but also only available
option for some of the people in this population (Eisenberg-Guyot et al, 2018). Thus,
while banks are declining, AFS are filling the gap left behind, giving them a functional
monopoly on the vulnerable populations they often target, essentially creating a captive
market for financial engagement.
AFS as a Financial Predator
Mentioned several times throughout the paper, the idea of AFS engaging in
predatory lending practices will be discussed thoroughly here. AFS specifically target
low-income and minority neighborhoods, with the purpose of trapping their customers
into cycles of debt and continuous loans with shocking levels of interest (Caplan, 2014).
Part of this problem is the result of AFS marketing themselves as easy, quick, short-term
solutions. However, research shows that as much as 76% of payday loan customers are
constantly having to take out another high interest loan (Parrish & King, 2009). Of those
repeat customers, 87% of them are forced to take out another payday loan within the very
next payment period. This is likely because most payday loans are taken out for recurrent
expenses, like paying rent, although a substantial amount is also taken out in response to
unexpected financial costs, such as medical bills (Eisenberg-Guyot, 2018).
To explain why in more detail, let us first examine how a payday loan typically
works. A customer takes out a loan, usually less than $500, with a very high interest rate.
This loan is due to be paid on the customer’s next payday. In theory, and according to
most payday lenders, this is a useful tool, because it allows customers to indirectly gain
6

immediate access to their next paycheck, and ideally, the loan would be paid off
immediately. However, this is quite often not how it works out for the customer (Parrish
& King, 2009). The incredibly high interest rate on these loans (which averages typically
around 400%) creates a massive and short-term balloon payment that can take up to 50%
of the average customer’s paycheck to pay off. Taking this much of their check to pay off
their payday loan often leaves customers in the familiar position of not having enough
money to last until their next payday, and without access to credit or traditional banking
infrastructure, that customer may have no little to no option but to take out another
payday loan. Additionally, AFS centers sometimes employ inaccurate or even
intentionally misleading information about how their services work, causing borrowers to
underestimate cost while overestimating their ability to pay back the loan easily
(Eisenberg-Guyot et al, 2018). Sometimes referred to as “churning,” this process of
constantly repeating the loan cycle effectively locks customers into debt (Parrish & King,
2009). As mentioned previously, AFS often aggregates in low-income and minority
neighborhoods who are less likely to have access to traditional banks, making them a
captive customer base (Caplan, 2014; Amel & Prager, 2014). Of course, this is a cycle
that the payday lending industry, a multibillion dollar industry as a result of their repeat
customers, has no incentive to break (Parrish & King, 2009). Specifically, payday lending
only derives about 2% of its total business each year from first-time, non-repeated
borrowers. Most borrowers take out nine loans per year, and 60% of payday lender
revenue is generated by borrowers who take out 12 or more loans per year.
Pawn shops, another form of AFS included in our definition, deserve more
attention by researchers, especially considering their age, dating back to the 15th century,
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in comparison to other forms of AFS that are relatively young (Lee, Gainey, & Triplett,
2013). In 2011, the National Pawnbrokers Association estimated that the number of pawn
shops was more than 13,000 and constituted a $14.5 billion industry annually (Kubrin &
Hipp, 2016). Pawnbrokers typically work by giving a customer a loan based on the
deposit of some piece of personal property, where the loan is typically 30 to 75% of the
value of the item (Lee, Gainey, & Triplett, 2013). They make a profit by charging a low
interest fee and being able to sell the item as forfeit should the loan go unpaid. While still
a common form of AFS, it is important to note that potential borrowers must pass a
different bar of entry for these loans: while a payday loan simply requires a source of
income, a pawn shop loan requires possessing a piece of property, or pieces of property,
deemed valuable enough that a loan based on a smaller portion of its value is still enough
to meet one’s financial need. Thus, pawnshops provide an alternative method of
obtaining cash and short-term loans for the unemployed, as long as they have items of
value that can be pawned. Despite this, the loans given by pawn shops can still be
accompanied by incredibly high interest rates (Kubrin & Hipp, 2016). These rates are
limited differently by state, but are typically determined by a percentage of the value of
the loan, and can range anywhere from 12% to 300%, making them another potentially
much more expensive avenue of financial interaction compared with traditional banks.
Check-cashing services also receive little attention in the current body of research
concerning underbanking, despite their prevalence making them potentially the most
commonly used (Kubrin & Hipp. 2016). Their popularity stems from the fact that they do
not provide loans that require repayment with high interest; rather, they collect a
percentage-based fee from the value of a check in exchange for providing the remaining
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value of the check immediately in cash. This fast turnaround for access to funds is
appealing and has obvious utility, even compared with some bank services who may
delay the access to a check’s value for a short time. This quickness of access explains the
service’s popularity, even among those with a bank account: check cashing services
handle about 180 million checks annually, worth roughly $55 billion. While the lack of a
high interest, short-term loan might make check-cashing seem more benign than other
forms of AFS, it should be noted that the average fees charged for cashed checks is
2.52%, but sometimes climbing as high as 5%. Applying the average rate to the value of
the average checks they handle, check-cashing services drain roughly $1.4 billion from
the underbanked people they serve, in return for granting immediate access to the rest of
their funds.
Until now, only a few forms of AFS have been mentioned in detail. This is not an
oversight; rather, the vast majority of the literature studying AFS has determined these
forms as the most predatory (Lee, Gainey, & Triplett, 2013). This sadly means that a
more in-depth investigation into most of the other forms of AFS included in the definition
used for this analysis would be very difficult and largely speculative without further
research that is beyond the scope of this analysis. Fortunately, the methods discussed
above account for most AFS interactions in the United States, and so while there is much
research left to be done on other manifestations of underbanking, the current body of
literature surrounding check-cashing services, payday lenders, and pawn shops, is
sufficient to serve as the basis for this paper.
Underbanking as a Sociological Issue
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It is appropriate at this point to recognize that it is undeniable that underbanking
has the look, at the surface, of being a solely microeconomic issue. However, when
examined in depth, underbanking is clearly something that sociologists should seek to
greater understand:
First, at the individual level, financial exclusion is a major indicator of social
exclusion (Fernandez-Olit, Aredes-Ga´zquez, & Cuesta-Gonza´lez 2016). Specifically,
Fernandez-Olit and colleagues were able to identify that being underbanked negatively
correlated with social exclusion, drawing the conclusion that the less one interacts with
banks, the more one is excluded from society. While their analysis was specific to
Europe, they drew several applicable conclusions. For example, in economies that are
“highly banked,” meaning a majority of the population uses banks to manage their
personal finances, being underbanked is a real barrier to social inclusion. Additionally,
they find that poverty rates for socially excluded populations increase after a financial
crisis within a country and identify that populations on the brink of poverty can be
pushed below the poverty line when (a) they do not have a bank and (b) a crisis creates a
situation where a bank can serve as a mediating force on the impact of a crisis. Both are
applicable to the United States, where a majority of the population is banked (with
underbanking being estimated around 12%), and where access to a bank helps generate
financial security (Gross et al, 2012). As will be discussed in depth later, immigrant
populations are uniquely vulnerable to this, as they fall victim to many barriers to social
integration which are unique to these groups.
Second, when underbanking is examined demographically, we see that it is
largely comprised of vulnerable populations. Specifically, underbanked people are often
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younger, low-income, low-educated, and people of color (Gross et al, 2012). Low-income
status as an indicator for being underbanked is particularly accurate in urban
neighborhoods, such as New York City, where the average rate of underbanking is higher
than the national average, but spikes to three times that average in the Bronx, which
happens to be the poorest of the boroughs that form the city (King and Saldarriaga,
2017). Additionally, immigrants, with or without approval from the government, have a
tendency to shy away from traditional banking infrastructure. Overall, being either lowincome status, or having an immigrant status, accounts for over half of all underbanked
people.
Third, underbanking creates an alarming number of barriers to financial stability;
something sociologists have long understood to carry negative implications to individuals
and family stability (Birkenmaier et al, 2015). During periods of economic hardship,
individuals turn to credit or savings to manage unexpected costs. However, without these
resources at their disposal, underbanked individuals often turn to less efficient methods of
payment, such as cash (which requires physically going to payment locations, requiring
transportation, and often, time off work), or the use of alternative financial services
(AFS), that cost much more than banking services. As will be discussed in depth below,
this carries a host of negative implications, from food insecurity to loss of employment,
creating an interlocking web of barriers to social stability.
Fourth, high rates of underbanking may have implications beyond the individual
who does not have a bank. An at length examination of the relationship between
underbanking and national-level economics has shown that countries with high rates of
underbanking experience slower technological advancement, job creation, and social
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mobility (Calomiris and Haber, 2011). Although Calomiris and Haber focus more on the
“credit starving” aspect of underbanking to a degree not appropriate for this study, they
do highlight an important reality: while underbanking may manifest itself most obviously
within the finances of underbanked individuals, there is a larger impact to society, and
specifically social mobility, when one takes a step back from the individual to see the
millions of people who qualify to wear the label of “underbanked.” Due to the continued
growth of the ratio of immigrant groups in the U.S., understanding the financial health
and practices of immigrant populations will become increasing important to
understanding overall financial trends within our economy and society as a whole
(Chatterjee & Zahirovic-Herbert, 2012).

Implications of being Underbanked

Vulnerability to financial shock and lack of credit. As discussed previously,
underbanking is a source of serious financial instability. While the circumstances of the
underbanked are often neglected by research (Baek & Devaney, 2010), prior studies have
found that the average wealth gap between banked and underbanked households is
substantial, estimated to be around $42,000 (Ampudia & Erhmann, 2017). Additionally,
these alternative services are extremely costly compared with banks (Office of the
Inspector General, 2014). In 2012, it was estimated that the comparative cost between
AFS and traditional banks was $89 billion. This number is highly impactful to people at
lower tiers of income. In that same year, households whose total income was $25,000 a
year or less paid on average $2,412 to AFS, roughly 9.5% of their total income, which is
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equivalent to what those households spent on food for the year (Office of the Inspector
General). This is particularly devastating, because the underbanked are on average only
$26 away from “breaking even” on their monthly bills; meaning that having access to a
bank would allow for a monthly financial surplus, rather than a financial deficit. This
stems from several factors, including the unfair business practices of formalized
alternative financial services (Anderloni et al, 2007), or the use of informal, underground
money transfer networks, especially in the cases of immigrant families attempting to
move money internationally (Peterson, 2013).
Relatively little is known about the ways in which households make decisions
about financial plans, such as dedicated savings or managing high-interest credit (Hilgert
& Hogart, 2003). For example, research from the 2008 financial crisis found that the
response by families to economic hardship is often strenuous and reliant on short-term
economic measures that are negative in the long term (Baek & Devaney, 2010). Although
underbanking has been on the decline in the population as a whole, roughly half of
underbanked households once had banks, and now do not (Rhine & Greene, 2012). This
indicates, for a substantial part of this group, it is not that they never had a bank account,
but rather, something is pushing them away from being banked. Additionally, it has been
shown that households in particular are not skilled in predicting or reacting to economic
hardships or unforeseen financial expenses, acting with a heavy reliance on credit (Baek
& Devaney, 2010). This means, for those households that are underbanked, the typical
resources used to deal with economic hardship are not available. With all of this in mind,
the lack of a financial safety net and vulnerability to financial shock should be seen as the
core issue faced by the underbanked.
13

Additionally, being without a bank also opens the possibility of “credit
invisibility,” which is what happens when a person has such little interact with the
traditional banking infrastructure, they do not have enough credit to apply for loans
(Turner, Walker, & Dusek 2009). This, in turn, limits their ability to borrow and cover
unexpected costs, and their ability to establish helpful resources to increase their financial
stability, such as buying a car/house, pursuing higher education, or opening a business
(Turner, Walker, & Dusek 2009; Nguyen, 2014). This highly restricted access to an
important potential resource in social mobility, combined with high cost of AFS, creates
a situation where the underbanked are uniquely vulnerable to economic downturns, at
both the micro and macro levels (Zedlewski, Chaudry, & Simms, 2008). Without the
ability to support themselves, the underbanked often get stuck behind the barrier of
cyclical poverty, and a high reliance on social programs, which sadly may also be
affected by macroeconomics or changing budgets, due to shifts in politics (Bok and
Simmons, 2002).
Employment. The relationship between employment and underbanking can be
understood as bidirectional: unemployment can encourage underbanking, and
underbanking can also encourage unemployment. The first point is easy to observe and
understand, as people without jobs may feel less compelled to exert any effort on
obtaining a bank account they may see themselves not using (Birkenmaier et al, 2015).
Getting a job, then, can compel people to become fully banked, as the value of being
banked increases, and some aspects of getting paid by an employer, such as direct
deposit, is entirely impossible without an account.
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However, the other direction of this relationship is also true. Specifically, this can
be seen through employment practices like credit checks as a qualification of being hired,
which is used by over half of American employers (Rosen and Bagus, 2010). Being
underbanked means sacrificing your participation in several key aspects of modern
society when it comes to economics, and the loss of these aspects can make one less
appealing to companies who view these aspects as important. Thus, while the idea that
unemployment can cause underbanking seems obvious, it is important to remember that
the absence of a bank account can prevent getting that job in the first place.
These implications are doubly true with immigrant populations, who are more
likely to experience a unique aspect of this relationship: they are much more likely to
engage in informal “day labor” work, where wages are “under the table” and negotiated
outside legally mandated requirements (Valenzuela, 2000). Not only is this population
unlikely to engage with banks, but the very nature of the jobs they are likely to work
discourage them from involving their incomes from traditional financial systems.

Food Insecurity. Research into financial practices of families and households
indicates that lacking stable bank access is a reliable predictor of also facing food
instability and hardship, which is generally defined as lacking the capacity to satisfy basic
nutrition and food consumption needs (Birkenmaier et al, 2015). People who fall into this
category face challenges such as having to reduce food intake below recommended
levels, or relying on food that does not provide healthy levels of nutrients. (While many
Americans do not eat healthy food, they at least have access to it.) Food insecurity carries
with it a long list of negative implications for families, from lowered academic and social
15

outcomes for children (Bhattacharya, Currie, & Haider, 2004; Jyoti, Frongillo, & Jones,
2005), to reduced health outcomes and malnutrition of people of all ages (Melchior et al,
2009), making it one of the most damaging manifestations of underbanking that can
occur for a household.

Health. Underbanking has also been shown to create anxiety, stress, and
increased levels of general dissatisfaction (Okech, 2013; Eisenberg-Guyot et al, 2018).
While the most obvious associations between these occurrences and underbanking stem
from the associated instability, Okech additionally found that having a bank account can
be seen as a status symbol that represented a certain level of maturity and togetherness.
Thus, mental health is affected not just by the financial instability generated from
underbanking, but also underbanking itself, as those without an account may be
constantly reminded in their everyday economic exchanges that they are going without
something that, they perceive, financially mature and literate people have.
Identifying the exact implications on health that underbanking has is difficult for
several reasons (Eisenberg-Guyot et al, 2018). Specifically, the underbanked are already
likely to experience constant sources of stress that impact health from other sources, like
discrimination. Additionally, as short-term loans are often taken out to pay unexpected
financial costs, it is possible that there is some issue of reverse causality, wherein people
who are sick seek out AFS, rather than AFS being the source of the negative health
outcome. Taking both of these into account, Eisenberg-Guyot and colleagues examined
longitudinal financial data and self-reported health claims, and found that, controlling for
necessary variables and elements of the model, people who had recently taken out a
16

short-term loan from an AFS location were 38% more likely to report their health as poor
or fair, and people without bank accounts were 17% more likely to report the same. Their
research explains that these connections should not be ignored, as constant, chronic stress
such as the type caused by underbanking is associated with higher risk of cardiac,
metabolic, immune, and inflammatory issues, as well as substance abuse and, in severe
causes of mental strain and depression, suicide.
Underbanking and Crime
As mentioned before, potentially one of the strongest implications of proximity
to, and use of, AFS is the increased exposure to criminal activity (Kubrin et al, 2011;
Kubrin & Hipp, 2016). Research into this topic has shown that simply being located
nearby AFS (within 5 miles) has a significant positive association with the rates of crime,
particularly robbery and other forms of theft as well as assault, in one’s neighborhood,
even when controlling for other types of land use and socio-demographics (Kubrin &
Hipp, 2016). There are many potential reasons for this, both directly related to aspects of
criminology and indirectly related through broader effects on the community.
Directly, and most obviously, people who are trapped in cycles of debt created by
reliance on AFS are potentially more likely to turn to criminal activities as a supplement
to their incomes (Kubrin et al, 2011). Additionally, AFS locations have been identified as
both crime generators and crime attractors (Kubrin & Hipp, 2016). Crime generators are
locations that just generally bring in large amounts of people and foot traffic, creating an
increased opportunity for crime. Inevitably, as more people congregate, more people
willing to engage in criminal behavior, as well potential victims of that behavior, are
brought together. However, crime attractors uniquely provide elements that specifically
17

attract both potential criminals and potential victims. Common crime attractors are
businesses that involve relatively high amounts of cash-based exchanges, and many AFS
transactions end by providing a customer a large sum of cash, making them particularly
vulnerable to robbers seeking to bring in a large haul. Readily available cash also tends to
attract potential criminals as well, who may be seeking to transfer funds into cash (which
is much easier to use in criminal transactions), or to sell illicitly gained property to a
pawn shop. Ultimately, while AFS often bring in a higher frequency of the general
public, they also inherently contain elements and practices that establish conditions that
are highly favorable to potential criminals.
Adding to this situation is the fact that the more predatory the AFS seem to be, the
worse the corresponding rise in crimes rates are for the surrounding area (Kubrin & Hipp,
2016). While their analysis was limited to only payday lenders, check-cashing services,
and pawn shops, Kubrin and Hipp were able to identify that different AFS locations
increase crime rates differently, with payday lenders increasing the frequency of robbery
by 94% on their block, check-cashing increasing that rate by 70%, and pawn shops
increasing larceny by 23%. Essentially, the AFS with the potentially largest impact on the
personal finance of the underbanked is also the most likely to subject them to robbery.
This analysis also showed that AFS as a crime attractor does not simply concentrate
crime in one specific area, meaning crime decreases in others, rather its criminogenic
nature radiates out to other blocks and across the neighborhood they populate.
Indirectly, AFS have been theoretically tied to weaker social ties within a
neighborhood, contributing to the deterioration of internal social controls that tend to aid
in lowering crime rates (Kubrin & Hipp, 2016). As will be discussed more in-depth in the
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theoretical framing of this research, the disorganization introduced into a community by
AFS can decrease community capacity for things like communication and supervision
between community members while increasing both actual and perceived degeneration of
the value of community membership and instability in the area. These breakdowns can
contribute to higher crime rates within affected communities by inhibiting internal
community functions that normally act as a preventative measure against land use
becoming criminogenic.
Ultimately, being subject to reliance AFS ultimately means also being faced with
a higher likelihood of being the victim of robbery (Kubrin & Hipp, 2016). Immigrant
populations are particularly vulnerable to this affect due to their potential reluctance to
report such crimes to the authorities (Osili & Paulson, 2004). These robberies can be
devastating, as customers are now without what was potentially the cash value from their
weekly paycheck or are potentially on the hook for paying back a predatory loan without
at least having the benefit from paying off whatever the loan was being taken out for.
Crime as an implication of underbanking acts to magnify and compound the core issues
being faced by this population: without a bank to work through, customers are subject to
incredibly expensive fees when conducting financial business, only to then be subject to
significantly higher odds that their funds, now mostly in cash, will be taken from them in
a robbery. Having a bank account would mean not only is the money one earns is more
effectively used, but also more securely kept out of the hands of potential criminal
elements. Also of note is that these crimes, of course, do not only target customers of
underbanking, but instead target everyone who lives in affected neighborhoods,
regardless of banking status (Kubrin et al, 2011). As Kubrin and colleagues note: “…all
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residents pay when they reside in neighborhoods with a concentration of payday lenders”
(p. 457).
Interestingly, there have also been counter-arguments that suggest that focusing
on payday lenders is based on a bias against those industries for being immoral, or even
simply unlikable (Wilcox & Eck, 2011). Wilcox and Eck argue that there are other
factors that contribute to the negative effects, specifically on crime rates, that researchers
seem to witness in the areas that experience high rates of payday lenders. They conclude
that the research is simply assuming a linkage between criminalization and something we
consider to be unpopular, and that “doing nothing” is a viable policy option. While I
agree that researchers should always be cautious about letting personal bias against
unpopular sites or facilities interfere with our ability to accurate perform research and
describe results, I believe the focus of this criticism is far too narrow; even if the link
between crime rates and payday lenders is not directly causal, more recognized
influencers of crime rates, such as poverty, instability, etc., are all positively associated
with the presence of underbanking. Simply put, AFS is clearly contributing to the factors
that could increase crime rates, meaning payday lenders could be simply one step
removed, rather than not being associated at all.
Other Controls
There are many factors that can play into one’s underbanking practices (Rhine &
Greene, 2012), and in recognition of that, this study includes a list of control variables
that should briefly be explained here. First, income level is a key factor. A steep decline
in income has been identified as the single largest indicator of becoming underbanked
(Rhine & Greene, 2012; King & Saldarriaga, 2017). Additionally, the average annual
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income of the underbanking population tends to be low, less than $30,000 (Office of the
Inspector General, 2014). Employment status is also highly correlated with
underbanking, for previously discussed reasons pertaining to the lack of a job resulting in
less incentive to seek a bank account (Birkenmaier et al, 2015). Level of education is also
a determining factor (Rhine & Greene, 2012; Office of the Inspector General, 2014; King
& Saldarriaga, 2017). In 2011, the FDIC estimated that roughly 45% of the underbanked
population had attended at least some college (Office of the Inspector General, 2014).
Education has also been shown to have a significant negative influence on the likelihood
that a fully banked family becomes underbanked (Rhine & Greene, 2012). For all the
above reasons, these three factors (income, employment, and education) are isolated by
this study as key determinants and are tested on their own before adding in the remaining
controls, as will be explained in more detail below.
While white families make up about half the underbanked population (Office of
the Inspector General, 2014), black and Hispanic people have a disproportionately higher
likelihood to currently be underbanked and to become underbanked in the future (Rhine
& Greene, 2012; King & Saldarriaga, 2017). The underbanked population is also
disproportionately young, with most of the underbanked being under the age of 25
(Office of the Inspector General, 2014). While the gender gap in underbanking is
relatively small, data indicates that women are slightly more likely to be underbanked
than men (Gross et al, 2012). Marital status can be an influencing factor on banking
decisions, because a married couple is likely to engage in more financial interactions than
a single person would, increasing the incentive to have a bank account (Rhine & Greene,
2012). The number of children is also controlled for the same reason: Rhine and Green’s
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analysis indicates that more members of the family mean more financial transactions, and
more transactions means a higher level of incentive to have a bank account.
Race/ethnicity, age, gender, marital status, and number of children will all be included in
this analysis.

Theoretical Framework
Immigration and Assimilation Theory
While sociological investigation into immigration and the experience of
immigrants is a longstanding tradition of the discipline, those investigations often seek to
understand the socioeconomic conditions of immigrants through measuring human
capital issues (like education) or labor participation rates (Paulson & Rhine, 2007;
Chatterjee & Zahirovic-Herbert, 2012). Largely forgotten is the ability of immigrants to
assimilate into the formal financial systems of their destination country. Furthermore,
generalizations about the economic health of immigrants tend to gloss over huge
differences in race, gender, and legal status among different immigrant groups or even
individual immigrants (Waters & Jimenez, 2005).
This lack of nuanced research into the formal financial assimilation of immigrants
is unfortunate for a few reasons. First, as explained throughout this study, having access
to a bank is a key gatekeeping issue to other aspects of financial health, such as dealing
with financial shocks, owning a home, being able to start a small business, or the ability
to securely retire (Osili & Paulson, 2004). Second, as immigration rates continue to
climb, the financial well-being of the national economy will be increasingly dependent on
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the financial health of the immigrant populations who participate in it (Chatterjee &
Zahirovic-Herbert, 2012). Finally, since engagement with formal financial institutions
requires a high degree of trust, the extent to which immigrants formally assimilate into
the banking system is an important indicator of how these groups adapt to and gain trust
in that system (Osili & Paulson, 2004).
In general, most theoretical approaches to explaining the assimilation rates of
immigrants see behaviors as a convergence of lines, where the line of behaviors an
immigrant brings with them tends to draw closer over time to the line of behaviors
engaged in by most native-born members of a society (Brown & Bean, 2006). However,
this is by no means a simple, linear relationship for all immigrants or in every facet in the
assimilation experience. Barriers to assimilation exist due to cultural, structural, and
contextual issues, such as discrimination, and can slow or even prevent the full
assimilation of certain immigrants or in certain areas, such as finances (Lee, 2009; Brown
& Bean, 2006). Thus, while the convergence of lines may appear accurate from a
generalized perspective, specific contexts of assimilation may not follow this pattern.
Financial assimilation is an apt example of this phenomenon. Economic mobility
and wealth accumulation is recognized as having an influence on all aspects of
assimilation for immigrant groups (Paulson & Rhine, 2007; Brown & Bean, 2006). While
it is generally true that the financial health of immigrants tends to improve over time, the
amount of time it takes for the differences between immigrants and native-born people to
disappear is considerable, estimated by some to be as long as 15-25 years (Paulson &
Rhine, 2007). Bank account ownership is no exception to this trend, as research has
shown that underbanking rates are particularly persistent even for immigrants who have
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lived in the U.S. for several years (Osili & Paulson, 2004). Understanding this timeframe
puts an important focus on second-generation immigrants, because the children of
immigrants are likely entering into financial markets at the critical time in which full
assimilation is obtainable (Paulson & Rhine, 2007; Brown & Bean, 2006).
Furthermore, immigrants are more prone to risky behaviors as a result of this
slowed financial integration (Chatterjee & Zahirovic-Herbert, 2012). Beyond being less
likely to have a bank account, they invest less resources into these accounts on average
even when they own them. They are also more likely to become underbanked compared
to native-born people, meaning they are more likely to have an account and then either
lose it or close it themselves (Osili & Paulson, 2006). This backwards movement
represents “negative assimilation,” where immigrants move further away from the typical
behavior of native-born people (Brown & Bean, 2006).
Thus, when examining underbanking from a theoretical perspective, it becomes
apparent that, while there is a clear tendency of the lines of financial behavior to
converge over time, there are unique barriers for immigrants that prevent full assimilation
from occurring. Institutional shortcomings, discrimination and social bias, and
systemically lower wealth accumulation and opportunities for mobility create a context in
which immigrants are less able to formally participate in our financial system. Ultimately,
a manifestation of this nexus of barriers to assimilation is persistently higher
underbanking rates among immigrant populations.
Immigration Status and Financial Practices
Immigrant populations are highly unlikely compared with the general population
to be involved in traditional financial institutions (King & Saldarriaga, 2017).
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Investigations into the 2013 Current Population Survey (CPS) that asked relevant
questions about financial practices confirmed this to be the case (Northwood & Rhine,
2016). This is particularly true of the Latin American and Hispanic community, where
33% of the population is underbanked, and recent immigrants of this population
experience underbanking rates as high as 50% (Stookey, 2010). It has been noted that this
may be difficult to gauge for undocumented immigrants, who may be reluctant to selfreport (Ondersma, 2016). Attempting to counter this with a qualitative approach,
Ondersma’s study utilized a snowball sample of undocumented immigrants in New York
City, and found that, of 52 individuals interviewed, 44 of them (81%) had engaged in
underbanking behaviors.
The reasons why this community seems to be especially afflicted by
underbanking are as varied as the reasons why underbanking exists. Immigrant
populations are likely to face language barriers, political pressure, and financial literacy
problems (Pauwels, 2011; Stookey, 2010). Culturally, they may see available financial
routes, like bankruptcy, as unwanted or unethical, or believe that banking services are not
available to immigrants. Overall, the reasons for underbanking in these populations
cannot be blamed solely on either banks or the population, as broader social structures
often have greater influence on financial integration than either of these parties do
(Stookey, 2010).
Differences Between First- and Second-Generation Immigrants
As mentioned before, immigration status is one of the largest indicators for
financial exclusion and underbanking. First-generation immigrants do experience higher
rates of poverty and unemployment than the general public, however, this effect has been
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shown to be greatly reduced when it comes to their children, called second-generation
immigrants (Pew Research Center, 2013). Indeed, findings have shown that secondgeneration immigrant adults experience less poverty, higher employment rates, higher
marriage rates, higher home ownership, and higher rates of graduating both high school
and college compared with their parents. These tend to hold true not just overall, but
within every age group over 25, indicating higher levels of life-long success, and not just
an early or late advantage.
Reflected throughout all of these is the idea that second-generation immigrant
adults have assimilated more thoroughly and successfully than their parents (Pew
Research Center, 2013). They likely grew up inside the American educational system,
allowing them to better overcome any potential language and cultural barriers their
parents might have faced. Overall, it can be said that this group resembles the general
population much more than first-generation immigrants do. Due to their more robust
assimilation and higher average incomes, one might expect that the rate of underbanking
among second-generation immigrants would be closer to that of those whose parents
were native born than the rates experienced by first-generation immigrants. This study
seeks to explore this idea and expound upon whether or not the trend of assimilation of
the children of immigrants holds true for banking practices, which is something that no
other study of underbanking has examined.
Banking Practices in Developed and Developing Countries
Financial behaviors among the general population vary widely by country. Since
2011, the World Bank has managed the Global Financial Inclusion Index (also called
“Global Findex”), that gives comparable financial behavior indicators by country
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(Demirguc-Kunt et al, 2015). This index revealed that in 2014, around 62% of adults
globally had a bank account, and that the number of unbanked adults dropped by 20%
between 2011 and 2014. However, this number when viewed within individual countries
varies widely: the highly developed economies of The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member-countries showed equally high rates of
account ownership, as much as 94% among adults. Compared to developing countries,
who averaged 54% but saw rates as low as 14% in regions like the Middle East, the gaps
in financial inclusion between stages of development become apparent.
These gaps do not just extend to inclusion, but to financial literacy as well, the
rates of which are similar to that of account ownership (Klapper, Lusardi, & Van
Oudheusden, 2015). The combination of being excluded from financial infrastructure
while also receiving little to no effective education on how these systems work or why
they are important to managing personal finances creates a myriad of barriers to financial
integration upon entering a new country (Chatterjee & Zahirovic-Herbert, 2012).
However, a person immigrating to a developed economy from another already developed
economy may experience far fewer of these barriers, as they would be much more likely
to have already had an account and understand its importance. It stands to reason, then,
that not all immigrant groups would experience underbanking the same way, depending
on the state of financial inclusion and literacy in country from which they immigrated.
Indeed, research has shown that the immigrants from countries or regions more
financially similar to the U.S. experienced less difficulty in establishing formal
participation in our economic system (Chatterjee & Zahirovic-Herbert, 2012). As
Chatterjee and Zahirovic-Herbert identify in their study, a more nuanced discussion of
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underbanking and immigration requires recognizing and accounting for these differences
at the country level, which this study seeks to facilitate.

Current Study
Underbanking is a financial phenomenon that has many causes and undesirable
effects in society, especially for immigrant populations. Especially for those who
immigrated from less developed countries, this group may experience increased rates of
underbanking for several reasons, such as cultural and language barriers and differing
banking practices from their country of birth. Being underbanked carries many negative
implications, and when viewed through the lens of social capital, is clearly seen as
potentially devastating for the financial stability of those affected. The current study
seeks to contribute to a growing body of literature concerning the financial integration
and banking practices of immigrant populations in the U.S. This will be accomplished by
testing the following hypotheses:
(H1) First-generation immigrants from developing countries will be the most likely to be
unbanked, underbanked, or to engage in individual underbanking behaviors compared to
all other groups.
(H2) Second-generation immigrants from developing countries be more likely to be
unbanked, underbanked, or to engage in individual underbanking behaviors, than citizens.
(H3) First- and second-generation immigrants from developed countries will be most
similar to citizens than all other immigrant groups.
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Methodology
Data
In June 2015, as an addendum to the Current Population Survey, the FDIC
conducted a survey that asked for a variety of information concerning the banking status
of individuals and families (Burhouse et al, 2016). This data is nationally representative
and large in scope: 52,801 households participated in the June 2015 CPS, and of those,
36,534 participated in the underbanking supplement. As a subset of the CPS respondents,
we know that respondents to the underbanking supplement consisted only of civilians,
who were both older than 15 years of age, and noninstitutionalized.
Measures
It should be noted that for all but one of the relevant variables to this analysis, the
survey presented “Yes/No” questions, which were then dummy coded (“No”=0 and
“Yes”=1) unless otherwise noted. For each variable, respondents who answered “Don’t
Know” or refused to answer the question were marked as missing, although a better
understanding of the group who answered “Don’t Know” should be the goal of a future
study. Additionally, around 30,000 people were listed as “Not in Universe” for all
variables, due to those who took the CPS but not the underbanking supplement; these
respondents were removed from the data set. After further removal of respondents who
listed themselves (or their parents, in the case of second-generation immigrants) as being
from countries identified as “in transition” (explained in more detail below), the total
sample size used for this analysis is 36,220.
Dependent Variables. Being unbanked. Respondents were asked, “Do you or
anyone else in your household have a checking or savings account now?” This variable
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was reverse coded for this analysis, since a response of “Yes” is actually a banked
behavior for this question (“Yes”=0. “No”=1). If they answered “No,” then they were
marked as unbanked.
Being underbanked. This includes all respondents who either reported being
unbanked, or answered “Yes” to having engaged in any form of alternative financial
services, including “money orders, check cashing, international remittances, payday
loans, refund anticipation loans, rent-to-own services, pawn shop loans, or auto title
loans” outside of traditional banks within the last 12 months.” Being underbanked is a
dummy indicator where 1 = having said “Yes” to any of the items and thus being
underbanked, and 0 = being fully banked (having a bank account and not having used any
AFS in the past 12 months).
Each of the underbanking behaviors were then analyzed individually as dependent
variables in the order of using a money order, using check-cashing services, sending
international remittances, taking out a Tax Refund Anticipation Loan, taking out a
payday loan, taking out a pawn shop loan, using a rent-to-own service, and taking out an
auto title loan. Order was determined by the number of respondents who answered “Yes”
to each behavior, ranging from most to least common.
Independent Variables. Immigrant status. This study divides respondents into
five categories for analysis: first-generation from a developing country, first-generation
from a developed country, second-generation whose parents are from a developing
country, second-generation whose parents are from a developed country, and U.S.
citizens (reference). To create these variables, a few steps were taken. Respondents were
asked to identify their citizenship status and how their citizenship was obtained, if they
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were citizens. Respondents were also asked to identify their country of birth, as well the
country of birth for their mothers and their fathers. For this analysis, those who identified
as “citizen through naturalization” or as “not a citizen” were coded as first-generation
immigrants. Those who indicated that they were citizens through being born in the U.S.
or one of the U.S. territories and also indicated that both of their parents were not born in
the U.S. were coded as second-generation immigrants. Finally, those who identified as
citizens by being born in the U.S. or one of the U.S. territories who had at least one
parent who was born in the U.S. were coded as citizens (reference category).
Additionally, citizens include those who indicated they had obtained citizenship by being
born abroad to “American parents”.
Respondents were also asked to report their country of birth, as well as for each of
their parents, each of which was assigned its own numeric code. These codes were then
compared against the 2014 United Nations Country Classification Index to assign them to
one of three categories: developing, developed, and in transition (United Nations, 2014).
For countries of birth that no longer exist, the countries were coded as the country that
currently exists where the old one once was; for example, the USSR was coded as Russia.
In instances where this could not be determined, or general categories such as “Other –
Europe” were used, the countries were coded into whatever category best represented
their geographical region. Due to its small nature, and recognition by the U.N. that
countries in this group experience qualities that could classify them easily in the other
categories, the response category of “in transition” was dropped from the data set.
From these two sets of variables (first-/second-generation, developed/developing
country), the five dummy variables used in this analysis were generated. For first31

generation immigrants, developed/developing country status is simply based upon their
listed of country of birth. For second-generation immigrants, this is based upon their
parents’ country of birth. The respondent is listed as a second-generation immigrant
whose parents are from developing countries if both parents are listed as being from
developing countries. If one or both parents are listed as being from a developed country,
the respondent is listed as a second-generation immigrant whose parents are from
developed countries. Citizens are the reference category.
Control Variables. Race/ethnicity was defined as Non-Hispanic White (reference
category), Non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, Non-Hispanic Asian, and Non-Hispanic Other.
Sex is a dummy variable indicating the respondent is male (reference category) or female.
Age is a continuous variable ranging from 15 to 85. Education is measured in four
categories: less than high school, high school, some college, and college (reference
category). Annual Income is measured in this study by taking the midpoint of the
presented ranges, divided by 1000 (so that a response of “38” indicates an income of
roughly $38,000 a year). Employment is divided into three categories: employed
(reference category), unemployed, and not in labor force (which generally refers to
people such as discouraged workers, who are not actively seeking employment). For this
analysis, students and “persons keeping house” were included in the unemployed
category, where in the original coding, they were listed as “Not in Labor Force.” Marital
Status was collapsed into three categories: Married, Never Married (reference category),
and Widowed/Divorced/Separated. Finally, Number of Own Children is a continuous
variable and includes all children that are in the household, under 18, and the biological
offspring of the respondent.
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Regression and Statistical Strategy
To test our hypotheses, a series of logistic regression strategies were employed.
For each relationship being tested (unbanked, underbanked, and then each of the 8
individual underbanking behaviors), a set of three regression models will be run. In
model 1, only first-generation from a developing country, first-generation from a
developed country, second-generation whose parents are from a developing country, and
second-generation whose parents are from a developed country are included, with
citizens as the reference category. Model 2 will add in controls for education,
employment, and income. As mentioned briefly before, isolating these control variables
will allow for the analysis to examine these key determinants of underbanking in closer
detail. Model 3 will then add in the remaining controls of race/ethnicity, age, sex, marital
status, and number of own children. This will allow for a better understanding of the
nature of the relationship between immigration and underbanking in the context of other
potentially influencing factors.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 contains summary descriptive statistics for the demographics of the
sample, as well as immigrant status both with and without the distinction between
developing/developed country of origins and a summary of the frequency of
underbanking behaviors. When it comes to underbanking behaviors, we can see that
6.37% of respondents reported being unbanked and 6.36% reported being underbanked.
14.82% reported purchasing a money order in the last 12 months, which is the timeframe
for all of the listed behaviors. 6.62% reported using a check-cashing service. 63.93% of
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respondents who said they had sent international remittances within the last 12 months
reported doing so outside of a traditional bank. Of the remaining behaviors, 2.65%
reported taking out a Tax Refund Anticipation Loan, 1.9% reported taking out a payday
loan, 1.89% reported taking out a loan through a pawn shop, 1.84% reported using a rentto-own service, and 1.41% reported taking out an auto title loan.
In the context of immigration status, 86.17% of respondents reported being
citizens. First-generation immigrants comprise 10.98% of respondents, with 1.68% being
from developed countries and 9.3% being from developing countries. Second-generation
immigrants make up 2.85% of respondents, with 1.08% having parents from developed
countries and 1.77% having parents from developing countries.
Finally, of the respondents included in this analysis, 10.46% of respondents
reported having less than a high school education, 26.83% reported having a high school
education, 29.56% reported having at least some college education, and 33.15% reported
having a college degree. 60.23% of respondents reported being currently employed, with
10.26% being unemployed and 29.51% being not in the labor force. Annual income of
the respondents is roughly $65,420 (SD=$53,950). When it comes to race, 72.9% are
white, with 10.58% being Black, 10.14% being Hispanic, 3.56% being Asian, and 2.81%
being other races. The average age of the respondents is 51.81 years old (SD=17.1 years).
Sex is a nearly even split, with 49.89% females and 50.11% males. In the context of
marital status, 23.77% reported having never been married, 49.36% reported being
currently married, and 26.87% reported being widowed, separated, or divorced. The
average number of children among respondents is 0.5 (SD=0.97).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Respondents to the Underbanking Supplement (N = 36,220)
Demographics
Freq.
%/Mean
SD
Underbanking Behaviors
Being Unbanked (N = 36,220)
2,307
6.37%
Being Underbanked (N = 36,220)
9,252
6.36%
Buying a money order (N = 34,590)
5,083
14.82%
Using check-cashing services (N = 34,322)
2,273
6.62%
Sending international remittances (N = 1,655)
1,058
63.93%
Taking out a Tax Refund Anticipation Loan (N = 34,194)
906
2.65%
Using a payday loan service (N = 34,310)
653
1.90%
Taking out a pawn shop loan (N = 34,311)
650
1.89%
Using a rent-to-own service (N = 34,244)
630
1.84%
Taking out an auto title loan (N = 34,200)
483
1.41%
Immigration Status
Citizen
31,212
86.17%
First Generation Immigrant
3,976
10.98%
Second Generation Immigrant
1,032
2.85%
Immigration Status by Country of Origin
Citizen
31,212
86.17%
First Generation, From Developed Country
609
1.68%
First Generation, From Developing Country
3,367
9.30%
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
392
1.08%
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country
640
1.77%
Education
Less Than High School
3,787
10.46%
High School
9,717
26.83%
Some College
10,708
29.56%
College Degree
12,008
33.15%
Employment
Employed
21,814
60.23%
Unemployed
3,716
10.26%
Not in Labor Force
10,690
29.51%
Annual Income
65.42
53.95
Race
White
26,405
72.90%
Black
3,833
10.58%
Hispanic
3,674
10.14%
Asian
1,289
3.56%
Other
1,019
2.81%
Age
51.81
17.1
Sex
Male
18,071
49.89%
Female
18,149
50.11%
Marital Status
Never Married
8,609
23.77%
Married
17,879
49.36%
Widowed/Seperated/Divorced
9,732
26.87%
Number of Children
0.5
0.97
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Due to the relatively high volume of tables in the following analysis, a table has
been placed at the end of this section (Table 12) that includes the Model 3 results for all
dependent variables examined in this study.
Being Unbanked
Table 4 contains the results of analysis in the context of being unbanked, or not
owning a checking or savings account with a bank. In Model 1, both categories of firstgeneration immigrants are significantly different from citizens, with those from
developed countries having 72% lower odds, and those from developing countries having
180% greater odds of being unbanked. However, neither category of second-generation
immigrant was significantly different from citizens in this model.
Introducing education, employment status, and income in Model 2 does not
change this pattern: first-generation immigrants remain significantly different, with those
from developed countries having 63% lower odds and those from developing countries
having 73% greater odds, and both categories of second-generation immigrants not being
significantly different from citizens. Education clearly plays a big part of account
ownership: compared to those with a college degree, those with less than high school
have 553% greater odds, those with a high school education have 255% greater odds, and
those with at least some college have 130% greater odds of being unbanked, all of which
are significant. Compared to those who are employed, the unemployed are significantly
different, having 104% greater odds of being unbanked. Those not in the labor force are
also significantly different, but with 38% lower odds of being unbanked. (Recall that this
category includes discouraged workers, students, and “persons keeping house”). Annual
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income is significant in this model and is associated with 4% lower odds for every $1,000
above the mean reported by respondents. This result is unchanged in Model 3.
Model 3 includes the remaining controls and changes the pattern for immigrant
groups. While first- and second-generation immigrants from developing countries are
significantly different from citizens, having 26% greater odds and 49% lower odds of
being underbanked respectively, either category of immigrant from developed countries
are no longer significantly different in this model. Changing the reference category shows
first-generation immigrants from a developing country have 120% greater odds of being
unbanked compared to those from a developed country, which is significant.
Additionally, second-generation immigrants whose parents are from a developing country
have 60% lower odds compared to first-generation immigrants from developing
countries, and 57% lower odds compared to second-generation immigrants whose parents
are from a developed country, which are also both significant (results for contrasts not
shown).
The inclusion of additional control variables reduces the magnitude of
relationships between education and underbanking, but all remain significant. Compared
to those with a college degree, those with less than high school have 448% greater odds,
those with a high school education have 201% greater odds, and those with at least some
college have 92% greater odds. It appears that the more education people obtain, the less
likely they are to be unbanked in comparison to all those with lower levels of education
(results not shown, all contrasts significant).
In terms of employment status, the magnitude and significance of being
unemployed, compared to those who are employed, remains the same as in Model 2.
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However, those not in the labor force, while still significantly different, now instead have
47% greater odds of being unbanked compared to the employed. They also differ
significantly from the unemployed, with 38% lower odds of being unbanked.
Compared to whites, Blacks have 232% greater odds of being unbanked, while
Hispanics have 151% greater odds, and other races have 143% greater odds, which are all
significant. Asians do not differ significantly from whites in this analysis. When
compared to Blacks, all contrasts are significant: Hispanics have 25% lower odds of
being unbanked, Asians have 74% lower odds of being unbanked, and other races have
27% lower odds of being unbanked. Changing the reference to Hispanics, only Asians
differ significantly, having 65% lower odds of being unbanked. Finally, in reference to
Asians, those of other races have 179% greater odds of being unbanked. (Results of
contrast categories not shown).
Age has a significant relationship with being unbanked in this analysis and is
associated with having 2% lower odds of being unbanked for year older a respondent is
than the mean. Sex is also significant, with males having 20% greater odds than females
to be unbanked. In terms of marital status, when compared to those who have never
married, those who are married have 41% lower odds of being unbanked, and those who
are widowed, separated, or divorced have 16% lower odds of being unbanked, both of
which are significant. In reference to those who are married, the widowed, separated, or
divorced differ significantly, having 42% higher odds of being unbanked (results not
shown). Finally, number of children is significant, associated with 19% higher odds of
being unbanked for each additional child reported by respondents.
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Table 2: Logistic Regression Analysis of Immigrants for Being Unbanked
Model 1
Odds Ratio
SE
First Generation, From Developed Country
0.28*** (0.09)
First Generation, From Developing Country
2.80*** (0.15)
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
0.57
(0.16)
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country
1.24
(0.20)
Education
Less than High School
High School
Some College
College Degree or Higher
Employment Status
Employed
Unemployed
Not in the Labor Force
Annual Income
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Age
Male
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
Widowed/Separated/Divorced
Number of Children
N
36220
Psuedo R-squared
0.02
Chi Squared
338.00
P-Value
0.00
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Model 2
Odds Ratio
SE
0.37** (0.12)
1.73*** (0.11)
0.64
(0.19)
0.95
(0.16)
6.53***
3.55***
2.30***

Model 3
Odds Ratio
SE
0.57
(0.19)
1.26**
(0.11)
1.17
(0.35)
0.51*** (0.09)

(0.66)
(0.35)
(0.23)

-

-

-

2.04***
0.62***
0.96***

(0.13)
(0.04)
(0.00)

-

5.48***
3.01***
1.92***

(0.58)
(0.30)
(0.20)

2.04***
1.47***
0.96***

(0.13)
(0.11)
(0.00)

3.32***
2.51***
0.87
2.43***
0.98***
1.20***

(0.21)
(0.21)
(0.17)
(0.27)
(0.00)
(0.06)

-

-

-

36220
0.25
4239.99
0.00

0.59*** (0.04)
0.84*
(0.06)
1.19*** (0.03)
36220
0.30
5160.58
0.00

Table 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of Immigrants for Being Underbanked
Model 1
Model 2
Odds Ratio
SE Odds Ratio
SE
First Generation, From Developed Country
0.61*** (0.07)
0.75*
(0.09)
First Generation, From Developing Country
2.71*** (0.10)
2.08*** (0.08)
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
0.47*** (0.07)
0.54*** (0.08)
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country
1.34*** (0.12)
1.16
(0.11)
Education
Less than High School
2.86*** (0.13)
High School
1.77*** (0.06)
Some College
1.54*** (0.06)
College Degree or Higher
Employment Status
Employed
Unemployed
1.36*** (0.05)
Not in the Labor Force
0.58*** (0.02)
Annual Income
0.99*** (0.00)
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Age
Male
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
Widowed/Separated/Divorced
Number of Children
N
36220
36220
Psuedo R-squared
0.02
0.09
Chi Squared
767.46
3659.92
P-Value
0.00
0.00
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Model 3
Odds Ratio
SE
0.95
(0.11)
1.66*** (0.09)
0.76
(0.12)
0.71*** (0.07)
2.75***
1.74***
1.48***

1.27***
1.06
0.99***

3.01***
1.77***
1.01
2.11***
0.98***
1.00

-

-

(0.13)
(0.07)
(0.05)

(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.00)

(0.12)
(0.09)
(0.08)
(0.15)
(0.00)
(0.03)

0.78*** (0.03)
0.98
(0.04)
1.09*** (0.02)
36220
0.13
5390.13
0.00

Being Underbanked
Table 5 shows the results of determining the odds of being underbanked, or of
engaging in any of the 9 underbanking behaviors. In Model 1, all four categories of
immigrants are statistically significant. Compared to citizens, being from a developed
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country is associated with lower odds of being underbanked, with 39% lower odds for
first-generation immigrants and 53% lower odds for second generation immigrants. As
predicted, being from a developing country has the opposite relationship, with firstgeneration immigrants in this category experiencing 171% greater odds, and secondgeneration immigrants experiencing 34% greater odds.
In Model 2, those from developed countries remain significant, with firstgeneration immigrants having 25% lower odds, and second-generation immigrants
having 46% lower odds. However, while first-generation immigrants from a developing
country remain significant with 108% greater odds, second generation immigrants whose
parents are from a developing country show no statistically significant difference from
citizens. Education plays a significant role across all categories, where, compared to
those with a college degree, those with less than a high school education experience
186% greater odds of being underbanked, those who completed high school experience
77% greater odds, and those who have received at least some college education
experience 54% greater odds. Employment status, with those who are employed as the
reference category, showed the unemployed to experience 36% greater odds to be
underbanked, while those who identified as not in the labor force have 42% lower odds,
with both results being significant. Annual Income, measured in $1,000s and centered to
the mean, is statistically significant, and is associated with 1% lower odds for every
increase of $1,000 above the mean. This result remains unchanged in Model 3.
Introducing the rest of the controls for Model 3, we see that only immigrants from
developing countries are statistically significantly different from citizens, with firstgeneration immigrants showing 66% greater odds of being underbanked, and second41

generation immigrants showing 29% lower odds to be underbanked. The result for
neither of the categories of immigrant from developed countries are significant. When
adjusting the reference category to first-generation immigrants from developed countries,
we see that first-generation immigrants from developing countries are significant, with
75% greater odds. When controlling for first-generation immigrants from developing
countries, both categories of second-generation immigrants are significant, showing 54%
lower odds for those whose parents are from developed countries, and 57% lower odds
for those whose parents are from developing countries. (Results for contrasts not shown).
Largely following the pattern from the results of the unbanked analysis,
introducing the rest of the controls lessened the magnitude of the relationship between
education and being underbanked, but all categories remain significant. Respondents
have lower odds of being underbanked compared to those with less education, no matter
what category is selected as the reference (results not shown, all contrasts significant).
Model 3 shows that, for employment status, those who are unemployed remain
significantly different from those who are employed, at 27% greater odds of being
underbanked. However, those not in the labor force are no longer significantly different.
Adjusting the reference category to those who are unemployed (results not shown), those
not in the labor force have 17% lower odds to be underbanked, which is significant.
Race is shown to have a substantial influence on one’s odds of being
underbanked, with Blacks having 201% greater odds, Hispanics having 77% greater
odds, and those from other racial groups having 111% greater odds of being underbanked
when compared to whites. Asians are not significantly different from whites. Switching
the referent category to Blacks, we can see that they experience the greatest odds
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compared to the other races, with Hispanics experiencing 41% lower odds, Asians
experiencing 66% lower odds, and other races experiencing 30% lower odds. When
compared to Hispanics, Asians report 43% lower odds and other races report 19% greater
odds, and finally, when compared to Asians, those of other races have 109% greater odds
to be underbanked. (Results not shown; all contrasts significant).
Age is statistically significant in this analysis and is associated with 2% lower
odds for every year older than the mean the respondent reported being. Sex, on the other
hand, is not statistically significant at all. Marital status in Model 3 shows that, compared
to those who have never been married, married respondents have 22% lower odds of
being underbanked. Those who are widowed, separated, or divorced are not significantly
different. However, compared to married respondents, those who are widowed, separated,
or divorced have 26% greater odds of being underbanked, which is significant (results not
shown).

Money Order
Table 6 shows the results of the analysis pertaining to whether respondents had
taken out a money order within the last 12 months. In Model 1, all four categories of
immigrants differ significantly from citizens. First- and second-generation immigrants
from developed countries have 44% lower odds and 55% lower odds, respectively, of
using a money order. First- and second-generation immigrants from developing countries
have greater odds, with first-generation immigrants having 77% greater odds and secondgeneration immigrants having 40% higher odds.
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In Model 2, the pattern for immigrants from developed countries continues, with
first-generation immigrants having 30% lower odds, and second-generation immigrants
having 49% lower odds, both of which are significant. For those from developing
countries, however, only first-generation immigrants remain significantly different from
citizens, with 35% greater odds. In terms of education, in comparison to those with a
college degree, all others differ significantly, with those with less than high school having
133% greater odds, those with a high school education having 76% greater odds, and
those with at least some college having 57% greater odds of using a money order. When
compared to those who are employed, the unemployed have 13% greater odds, and those
not in the labor force have 41% lower odds of using a money order, both of which are
significant. Annual income is also significant and is associated with having 1% lower
odds of using a money order for every $1,000 above the mean reported by respondents.
This remains unchanged in Model 3.
In Model 3, the only category of immigrant that differs significantly from citizens
are first-generation immigrants from developing countries, who have 14% greater odds of
using a money order. Further analysis with contrast categories (results not shown) shows
that second-generation immigrants whose parents are from developing countries are
significantly different when compared to first-generation immigrants from developing
countries and have 27% lower odds of using a money order. No other contrasts were
significant.
Education’s relationship with this underbanking behavior follows the same
pattern as in prior analyses: all categories remain significant with slightly lessened
magnitude in their coefficients. All contrast categories remain significant as well and
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show that respondents have lower odds of using a money order when compared to those
with less education (results not shown).
In the context of employment, Model 3 shows no significant difference between
the employed, unemployed, and those not in the labor force, even when adjusting the
reference to account for all contrast categories.
Compared to whites, Blacks have 246% greater odds of using a money order,
Hispanics have 77% greater odds, and those of other races have 113% greater odds,
which are all significant. Asians again do not differ significantly from whites. When
adjusting reference categories (results not shown; all contrasts significant), the same
pattern observed in the underbanking and unbanking analyses are observed for money
orders: Hispanics, Asians, and other races differ significantly from Blacks, all having
lower odds of using a money order. When compared to Hispanics, Asians have 54%
lower odds and other races have 20% greater odds. Compared with Asians, other races
have 159% greater odds of using a money order.
Age has a significant relationship with using a money order and is associated with
having 2% lower odds for every year above the mean reported by respondents. Sex is
significant, with males reporting 9% lower odds of using a money order compared to
females. Compared to those who never married, those who are married have 14% lower
odds, which is significant, but those who are widowed, separated, or divorced, do not
differ significantly. Compared to those who are married, those who are widowed,
separated, or divorced differ significantly, having 27% greater odds. Finally, number of
children was not shown to have a significant relationship with using a money order.
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Table 4: Logistic Regression Analysis of Immigrants for Purchasing a Money Order
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Odds Ratio
SE Odds Ratio
SE Odds Ratio
SE
First Generation, From Developed Country
0.56*** (0.08) 0.70*
(0.11) 0.91
(0.14)
First Generation, From Developing Country
1.77*** (0.08) 1.35*** (0.07) 1.14*
(0.07)
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
0.45*** (0.09) 0.51**
(0.11) 0.76
(0.16)
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country
1.40** (0.15) 1.23
(0.14) 0.84
(0.10)
Education
Less than High School
2.33*** (0.13) 2.18*** (0.13)
High School
1.76*** (0.08) 1.71*** (0.08)
Some College
1.57*** (0.07) 1.50*** (0.07)
College Degree or Higher
Employment Status
Employed
Unemployed
1.13*
(0.05) 1.04
(0.05)
Not in the Labor Force
0.59*** (0.02) 0.99
(0.05)
Annual Income
0.99*** (0.00) 0.99*** (0.00)
Race
White
Black
3.46*** (0.15)
Hispanic
1.77*** (0.11)
Asian
0.82
(0.10)
Other
2.13*** (0.17)
Age
0.98*** (0.00)
Male
0.91**
(0.03)
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
0.86*** (0.04)
Widowed/Separated/Divorced
1.09
(0.05)
Number of Children
1.03
(0.02)
N
34297
34297
34297
Psuedo R-squared
0.01
0.06
0.11
Chi Squared
190.06
1852.70
3151.40
P-Value
0.00
0.00
0.00
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table 5: Logistic Regression Analysis of Immigrants for Using a Check-cashing Service
Model 1
Model 2
Odds Ratio
SE Odds Ratio
SE
First Generation, From Developed Country
0.64*
(0.13)
0.81
(0.17)
First Generation, From Developing Country
1.59*** (0.10)
1.18*
(0.08)
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
0.59
(0.16)
0.73
(0.20)
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country 1.15
(0.18)
0.97
(0.16)
Education
Less than High School
2.49*** (0.20)
High School
1.83*** (0.12)
Some College
1.69*** (0.11)
College Degree or Higher
Employment Status
Employed
Unemployed
1.29*** (0.08)
Not in the Labor Force
0.52*** (0.03)
Annual Income
0.99*** (0.00)
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Age
Male
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
Widowed/Separated/Divorced
Number of Children
N
34322
34322
Psuedo R-squared
0.00
0.05
Chi Squared
58.47
833.46
P-Value
0.00
0.00
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Model 3
Odds Ratio
SE
0.97
(0.21)
1.10
(0.10)
0.93
(0.26)
0.74
(0.13)
2.34***
1.79***
1.63***

(0.20)
(0.12)
(0.11)

1.23**
0.88
0.99***

(0.08)
(0.06)
(0.00)

1.59***
1.34***
0.65*
1.94***
0.98***
1.07

(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.12)
(0.20)
(0.00)
(0.05)

-

-

0.81***
(0.05)
0.99
(0.07)
1.07**
(0.02)
34322
0.07
1119.74
0.00

Check-cashing Services
Table 7 shows the results of analysis concerning the use of check-cashing services
within the last 12 months. In Model 1, only first-generation immigrants differ
significantly from citizens, with those from developed countries having 36% lower odds,
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and those from developing countries having 59% higher odds of using a check-cashing
service.
In Model 2, only one immigrant category remains significant: first-generation
immigrants from developing countries have 18% greater odds of using a check-cashing
service when compared to citizens. When it comes to education, compared to those with a
college degree, those with less than high school have 149% greater odds of using a
check-cashing service, those with a high school education have 83% greater odds, and
those with at least some college have 69% greater odds. Employment status is shown to
also play a substantial role. In reference to the employed, the unemployed have 29%
greater odds of using a check-cashing service, and those not in the labor force have 48%
lower odds, both of which are significant. Annual income is shown to have a significant
relationship and is associated with 1% lower odds to use a check-cashing service for
every $1,000 above the mean reported by respondents. This remains unchanged in Model
3.
In Model 3, no immigrant category remains significantly different from citizens.
When testing contrast categories for further analysis (results not shown), only one
significant comparison exists: when compared to first-generation immigrants from
developing countries, second-generation immigrants whose parents are from developing
countries have 34% lower odds to use a check-cashing service.
As with other prior models, the introduction of the rest of the control variables
slightly decreases the magnitude of the coefficients of education, but all categories
remain significant compared to those with a college degree. Additionally, when adjusting
the reference category to those with less than high school, those with a high school
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education have 24% lower odds of using a check-cashing service, and those with at least
some college have 30% lower odds, both of which are significant. However, there are no
other significant contrasts when a high school education is the reference category.
(Results for contrasts not shown).
In the context of employment status, compared to the employed, the unemployed
have 23% greater odds of using a check-cashing service. Further analysis shows that,
only when compared to the unemployed, those not the in the labor force differ
significantly and have 39% lower odds of using a check-cashing service (results not
shown).
Compared to whites, Blacks have 59% greater odds to use a check-cashing
service, Hispanics have 34% greater odds, and those of other races have 94% greater
odds, all of which are significant. Asians also differ significantly, having 35% lower
odds. In reference to Blacks, only Asians are significantly different, with 59% lower odds
to use a check-cashing service. When the reference is adjusted to Hispanics, Asians
remain significant with 51% lower odds, and other races are significant with 45% greater
odds. Compared to Asians, other races have 197% greater odds of using a check-cashing
service, which is significant. (Results for contrasts not shown).
Age is shown to have a significant relationship with using a check-cashing service
and is associated with 2% lower odds for every year above the mean reported by
respondents. Sex is not significant in this analysis. When it comes to marital status,
compared to those who have never married, those who are married differ significantly,
having 19% lower odds of using a check-cashing service. While those who are widowed,
separated, or divorced are not significantly different from those who never married, they
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are significantly different compared to those who are married, having 23% greater odds
of using a check-cashing service (results not shown). Finally, number of children is
shown to have a significant relationship and is associated with 7% greater odds to use a
check-cashing service for each additional child reported by respondents.

International Remittances
Table 8 shows the results of analysis concerning sending international remittances
outside of a traditional bank. In Model 1, neither first- nor second-generation immigrants
from developed countries differ significantly from citizens. However, first- and secondgeneration immigrants from developing countries are significantly different, having
189% greater odds and 204% greater odds, respectively, to send such remittances.
In Model 2, first- and second-generation immigrants from developing countries
remain the only categories that are significantly different from citizens, with firstgeneration immigrants having 109% greater odds to send remittances outside a bank, and
second-generation immigrants having 144% greater odds. In terms of education,
compared to those with a college degree, those with less than school have 173% greater
odds to send such remittances, those with a high school education have 85% greater odds,
and those with at least some college have 53% greater odds. There is no significant
difference when comparing the employed to the unemployed or to those not in the labor
force. Annual income is shown to be statistically significant but returns an odds ratio of
exactly 1.00 in both Models 2 and 3, meaning income has no effect on the odds of
sending such remittances.
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In Model 3, immigrants from developing countries remain significant, with firstgeneration immigrants having 109% greater odds to send remittances outside a bank, and
second-generation immigrants having 139% greater odds. When adjusting the reference
category to first-generation immigrants who are from developed countries, immigrants
from developing countries are significantly different, with first-generation immigrants
having 131% greater odds, and second-generation immigrants having 164% greater odds
(results not shown; no other contrasts significant).
Compared to those with a college degree, those with less than high school have
124% greater odds, and those with a high school education have 62% greater odds, both
of which are significant. Those with at least some college are not significantly different.
When testing contrast categories (results not shown), those with at least some college
have 40% lower odds to send such remittances outside a bank when compared to those
with less than high school. No other contrasts were significant.
When testing employment, including all contrast categories (results not shown),
no significant results were returned.
Compared to whites, only Blacks and Asians differ significantly, having 72%
greater odds and 36% lower odds, respectively, of sending remittances outside a bank.
Asians differ significantly from Blacks, having 63% lower odds, and from Hispanics,
having 46% lower odds. (Results for contrasts not shown; no other contrasts significant).
Age, sex, marital status, and number of children were all shown to have no
statistically significant relationships when examining sending remittances outside a bank.
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Table 6: Logistic Regression Analysis of Immigrants for Sending International Remittances Outside of a Bank
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Odds Ratio
SE
Odds Ratio
SE Odds Ratio
SE
First Generation, From Developed Country
0.74
(0.19)
0.90
(0.24)
0.91
(0.24)
First Generation, From Developing Country
2.89*** (0.33)
2.09***
(0.26)
2.09*** (0.35)
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
0.43
(0.36)
0.41
(0.35)
0.48
(0.41)
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country
3.04*** (0.93)
2.44**
(0.76)
2.39**
(0.81)
Education
Less than High School
2.73***
(0.49)
2.24*** (0.44)
High School
1.85***
(0.29)
1.62**
(0.27)
Some College
1.53**
(0.22)
1.33
(0.20)
College Degree or Higher
Employment Status
Employed
Unemployed
0.75
(0.12)
0.77
(0.13)
Not in the Labor Force
0.72
(0.13)
0.89
(0.18)
Annual Income
1.00***
(0.00)
1.00**
(0.00)
Race
White
Black
1.72*
(0.38)
Hispanic
1.18
(0.23)
Asian
0.64*
(0.13)
Other
1.23
(0.42)
Age
0.99
(0.01)
Male
1.06
(0.13)
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
1.12
(0.17)
Widowed/Separated/Divorced
0.94
(0.19)
Number of Children
1.06
(0.06)
N
1655
1655
1655
Psuedo R-squared
0.05
0.09
0.10
Chi Squared
109.58
187.74
217.73
P-Value
0.00
0.00
0.00
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table 7: Logistic Regression Analysis of Immigrants for Taking Out a Tax Refund Anticipation Loan
Model 1
Model 2
Odds Ratio
SE Odds Ratio SE
First Generation, From Developed Country
0.64
(0.21) 0.77
(0.25)
First Generation, From Developing Country
0.93
(0.11) 0.75*
(0.09)
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
0.40
(0.20) 0.51
(0.26)
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country
1.14
(0.28) 0.98
(0.24)
Education
Less than High School
1.60*** (0.21)
High School
1.57*** (0.15)
Some College
1.31** (0.13)
College Degree or Higher
Employment Status
Employed
Unemployed
1.18
(0.12)
Not in the Labor Force
0.46*** (0.04)
Annual Income
0.99*** (0.00)
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Age
Male
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
Widowed/Separated/Divorced
Number of Children
N
34194
34194
Psuedo R-squared
0.00
0.02
Chi Squared
7.15
189.74
P-Value
0.13
0.00
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Model 3
Odds Ratio
SE
0.84
(0.27)
0.62**
(0.10)
0.62
(0.31)
0.73
(0.19)
1.55**
1.59***
1.31**

(0.21)
(0.16)
(0.13)

1.03
0.70**
1.00***

(0.10)
(0.08)
(0.00)

1.57***
1.19
1.46
1.53*
0.99**
0.89

(0.15)
(0.16)
(0.33)
(0.25)
(0.00)
(0.06)

-

-

0.77**
(0.07)
0.74**
(0.08)
1.19*** (0.04)
34194
0.04
311.28
0.00

Tax Refund Anticipation Loan
Table 9 shows the results of analysis concerning the use of a Tax Refund
Anticipation Loan. In Model 1, none of the immigrant categories reported being
significantly different from citizens.
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In Model 2, first-generation immigrants from developing countries are the only
immigrant category to differ significantly from citizens and have 25% lower odds of
taking a Tax Refund Anticipation Loan. When it comes to education, compared to those
with a college degree, those with less than high school have 60% greater odds of taking
such a loan, those with a high school education have 57% greater odds, and those with at
least some college have 31% greater odds. In terms of employment status, only those not
in the labor force are significantly different from the employed, with 54% lower odds of
taking such a loan. Annual income is shown to have a significant relationship with taking
such a loan and is associated with 1% lower odds for every $1,000 above the mean
reported by respondents. While income remains significant in Model 3, it reports an odds
ratio of exactly 1.00, meaning there is no change in the odds of taking such a loan based
on annual income.
In Model 3, first-generation immigrants from developing countries remain
significant, having 38% lower odds of taking a Tax Refund Anticipation Loan. No other
immigrant category is significantly different from citizens, and there are no significant
contrasts (results not shown).
Compared to those with a college degree, all other categories remain significant,
with those with less than high school have 55% greater odds of taking a Tax Refund
Anticipation Loan, those with a high school education having 59% greater odds, and
those with at least some college having 31% greater odds. Further analysis using contrast
categories shows only one additional significant difference: when compared to those with
a high school education, those with at least some college have 17% lower odds of taking
such a loan (results not shown).
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When it comes to employment status, those not in the labor force remain
significantly different from the employed, having 30% lower odds of taking a Tax
Refund Anticipation Loan. While the unemployed are not significantly different from the
employed in this model, when set as the reference category, those not in the labor force
are significantly different, having 32% lower odds of taking such a loan.
In the context of race, when compared to whites, Blacks have 57% greater odds of
taking a Tax Refund Anticipation Loan, and those of other races have 53% greater odds,
both of which are significant. Hispanics and Asians do not significantly differ from
whites in this analysis, and no contrast categories report significant differences upon
further analysis (results not shown).
Age is shown to have a significant relationship with taking out a Tax Refund
Anticipation Loan and is associated with having 1% lower odds for every year above the
mean reported by respondents. Sex is not significant in this analysis. In terms of marital
status, when compared to those who never married, those who are married have 23%
lower odds of taking such a loan, and those who are widowed, separated, or divorced
have 26% lower odds, both of which are significant. (No contrasts for marital status were
significant in this model; results not shown). Finally, number of children is shown to have
a significant relationship and is associated with having 19% greater odds to take out such
a loan for each additional child reported by respondents.
Payday Loans
Table 10 shows the results of analysis concerning the use of a payday loan within
the last 12 months. In Model 1, only one category of immigrant was shown to be
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significantly different from citizen: first-generation immigrants from a developed country
have 82% lower odds of using a payday loan.
In Model 2, again only first-generation immigrants from a developed country
were significant, having 76% lower odds of using a payday loan compared to citizens. In
terms of education, when compared to those with a college degree, those with less than
high school have 158% greater odds of using a payday loan, those with a high school
education have 116% greater odds, and those with at least some college have 134%
greater odds. When it comes to employment status, only those not in the labor force
differed significantly from the employed, with 58% lower odds of using a payday loan.
Annual income is shown to have a significant relationship with using a payday loan and
is associated with 1% lower odds for every $1,000 above the mean reported by
respondents. This remains unchanged in Model 3.
In Model 3, there are no significant relationships between citizens and any of the
four immigrant categories. This persists when testing contrast categories, as no
significant relationships emerge when comparing any of the immigrant categories to each
other (results not shown).
Education in the context of using a payday loan does not follow the same pattern
as the other behaviors mentioned up to this point. Compared to those with a college
degree, all other categories remain significant, with those who have less than high school
having 135% greater odds, those with a high school education having 106% greater odds,
and those with some college having 121% greater odds. While in prior results, it followed
that less education meant comparatively higher odds across all categories, those with
some college education report higher odds than those with a high school education
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compared to those with a college degree. There are no significant differences shown
when adjusting the reference to any other category (results not shown).
In the context of employment status, those not in the labor force have 28% lower
odds of using a payday loan compared to the employed, which is significant. No other
significant relations were shown on further analysis with contrast categories (results not
shown).
When it comes to race, compared to whites, Blacks have 140% greater odds of
using a payday loan, Hispanics have 60% greater odds, and those of other races have
155% greater odds. Asians do not differ significantly from whites. Adjusting the
reference category to Blacks shows that Hispanics have 33% lower odds and Asians have
68% lower odds, both of which are significant. Compared to Hispanics, Asians have 52%
lower odds, while other races have 60% greater odds, which are both significant. Finally,
when compared to Asians, other races differ significantly, having 231% greater odds of
using a money order. (Results for contrasts not shown).
Age has a significant relationship with using a payday loan and is associated with
2% greater odds for every year about the mean reported by respondents. Sex does not
have any significant relationship to using a payday loan. In terms of marital status, there
is no significant difference for those who are married, or those who are widowed,
separated, or divorced, compared to those who have never married. However, when
compared to those who are married (results not shown), those who are widowed,
separated, or divorced do differ significantly, having 27% greater odds of using a payday
loan. Finally, number of children does have a significant relationship, and is associated
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Table 8: Logistic Regression Analysis of Immigrants for Taking Out a Payday Loan
Model 1
Model 2
Odds Ratio
SE Odds Ratio SE
First Generation, From Developed Country
0.18*
(0.13)
0.24*
(0.17)
First Generation, From Developing Country
1.16
(0.15)
0.89
(0.12)
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
0.14
(0.14)
0.19
(0.19)
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country
1.42
(0.37)
1.21
(0.31)
Education
Less than High School
2.58*** (0.41)
High School
2.16*** (0.28)
Some College
2.34*** (0.30)
College Degree or Higher
Employment Status
Employed
Unemployed
0.93
(0.11)
Not in the Labor Force
0.42*** (0.04)
Annual Income
0.99*** (0.00)
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Age
Male
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
Widowed/Separated/Divorced
Number of Children
N
34310
34310
Psuedo R-squared
0.00
0.04
Chi Squared
22.64
288.11
P-Value
0.00
0.00
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Model 3
Odds Ratio
SE
0.30
(0.22)
0.77
(0.13)
0.26
(0.26)
0.88
(0.25)
2.35***
2.06***
2.21***

(0.38)
(0.28)
(0.28)

0.82
0.72**
0.99***

(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.00)

2.40***
1.60**
0.77
2.55***
0.98***
0.92

(0.25)
(0.24)
(0.28)
(0.42)
(0.00)
(0.08)

-

-

0.88
(0.10)
1.11
(0.13)
1.12**
(0.04)
34310
0.07
446.67
0.00

Table 9: Logistic Regression Analysis of Immigrants for Taking Out a Pawn Shop Loan
Model 1
Model 2
Odds Ratio
SE Odds Ratio
SE
First Generation, From Developed Country
0.26*
(0.15) 0.35
(0.20)
First Generation, From Developing Country
0.81
(0.12) 0.58*** (0.09)
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
0.27
(0.19) 0.34
(0.24)
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country
1.12
(0.32) 0.94
(0.27)
Education
Less than High School
2.52*** (0.40)
High School
2.24*** (0.30)
Some College
2.05*** (0.28)
College Degree or Higher
Employment Status
Employed
Unemployed
1.61*** (0.17)
Not in the Labor Force
0.57*** (0.06)
Annual Income
0.98*** (0.00)
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Age
Male
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
Widowed/Separated/Divorced
Number of Children
N
34311
34311
Psuedo R-squared
0.00
0.07
Chi Squared
15.82
442.62
P-Value
0.00
0.00
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Model 3
Odds Ratio
SE
0.44
(0.26)
0.49*** (0.09)
0.44
(0.31)
0.63
(0.20)
2.31***
2.12***
1.90***

(0.38)
(0.29)
(0.26)

1.62***
1.17
0.99***

(0.18)
(0.15)
(0.00)

1.37**
1.49**
0.82
1.82***
0.97***
1.41***

(0.16)
(0.22)
(0.31)
(0.31)
(0.00)
(0.12)

-

-

1.06
(0.12)
1.88*** (0.22)
1.09*
(0.04)
34311
0.09
595.63
0.00

with 12% greater odds of using a payday loan for each additional child reported by
respondents.
Pawn Shops
Table 11 shows the results of analysis concerning the use of a pawn shop loan
within the last 12 months. In Model 1, only first-generation immigrants from developed
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countries are significantly different when compared to citizens and have 74% lower odds
of using a pawn shop loan. None of the other immigrant groups differ significantly in this
model.
In Model 2, the only immigrant group that is significantly different from citizens
are first-generation immigrants from developing countries, who have 42% lower odds of
using a pawn shop loan. When it comes to education, compared to those with a college
degree, those with less than high school have 152% greater odds, those with a high
school education have 124% greater odds, and those with some college have 105%
greater odds, all of which are significant. In terms of employment, both the unemployed
and those not in the labor force differ significantly from the employed, with the former
having 61% greater odds to use a pawn shop loan, and the latter having 43% lower odds.
Annual income is shown to have a significant relationship with the use of a pawn shop
loan and is associated with 2% lower odds for every $1,000 above the mean reported by
respondents. This remains significant in Model 3, but changes to having 1% lower odds.
In Model 3, first-generation immigrants from developing countries remain
significant, having 51% lower odds to use a pawn shop loan compared to citizens. No
contrasts are significant in this analysis (results not shown).
Introducing the rest of the controls has the same pattern on education as in former
results when using those with a college degree as the reference category: all remain
significant with slightly lessened coefficients. However, in this analysis, no contrasts
were significant (results not shown).
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In the context of employment status, when compared to the employed, the
unemployed remain significant and have 62% greater odds to use a pawn shop loan.
Those not in the labor force are no longer significant. When compared to the
unemployed, however, those not in the labor force are significant, having 38% lower
odds of using a pawn shop loan (results not shown).
Compared to whites, Blacks have 37% greater odds to use a pawn shop loan,
Hispanics have 49% higher odds, and those of other races have 82% greater odds, all of
which are significant. Asians do not differ significantly from whites. Further analysis
with contrast categories revealed no other significant relationships (results not shown).
Age has a significant relationship and is associated with having 3% lower odds
for every year above the mean reported by respondents. Sex is also significant, with
males having 41% greater odds to use a pawn shop loan compared to females. In terms of
marital status, no significant difference is shown between those who never married and
those who are married. However, those who are widowed, separated, or divorced differ
significantly from those who never married, having 88% greater odds, and from those
who are married, with 78% greater odds (results not shown). Finally, number of children
is shown to have a significant relationship and is associated with 9% greater odds to use a
pawn shop loan for each additional child reported by respondents.

Rent-to-own Services
Table 12 shows the result of analysis dealing with the use of a rent-to-own service
within the last 12 months. For this analysis, there were no second-generation immigrants
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whose parents are from developed countries who had used such services, creating a zerocell issue. To resolve this, they were removed from the regression model; thus, immigrant
categories are being compared to both citizens and second-generation immigrants whose
parents are from developed countries for this analysis. In Model 1, only first-generation
immigrants from a developed country were shown to be significantly different, having
72% lower odds of using a rent-to-own service.
In Model 2, first-generation immigrants from a developed country are no longer
significant. However, both categories of immigrant a developing country do differ
significantly, with first-generation immigrants having 39% lower odds of using a rent-toown service, and second-generation immigrants having 56% lower odds. Education
appears to play a substantial role in this relationship, as those with less than high school
have 433% greater odds, those with a high school education have 242% greater odds, and
those with at least some college have 216% greater odds, compared those with a college
degree. In the context of employment, only those in the labor force differ significantly
from the employed and have 55% lower odds of using such a service. Annual income is
shown to have a significant relationship and is associated with having 2% lower odds of
using such a service for every $1,000 above the mean reported by respondents. Annual
income remains significant in Model 3, but the association changes to having 1% lower
odds.
In Model 3, both categories of immigrants from developing countries remain
significantly different, with first-generation immigrants having 47% lower odds and
second-generation immigrants having 75% lower odds. Further analysis showed no
significant contrast categories (results not shown).
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Education continued a similar pattern as in prior analysis: those with less than
high school have 409% greater odds of using a rent-to-own service, those with a high
school education have 240% greater odds, and those with at least some college have
198% greater odds compared to those with a college degree. When adjusting the
reference category to those with less than high school (results not shown), those with a
high school education have 33% lower odds, and those with at least some college have
42% lower odds. No other contrasts were significant in this analysis.
When it comes to employment, those who are unemployed become significant in
this model, and have 26% lower odds of using a rent-to-own service. Those who are not
in the labor force, however, are only significant when compared to the unemployed, and
have 72% greater odds of using such a service (results not shown).
Compared to whites, Blacks have 54% greater odds of using a rent-to-own
service, Hispanics have 44% greater odds, and those of other races have 94% greater
odds, which are all significant. Asians do not differ significantly from whites in this
analysis. No contrast categories were shown to be significant (results not shown).
Age is shown to have a significant relationship with using a rent-to-own service
and is associated with having 4% lower odds for every year above the mean reported by
respondents. Sex is also significant, with males having 26% lower odds compared to
females to use such a service. Compared to those who have never married, those who are
married are significantly different and have 31% greater odds. Those who are widowed,
separated, or divorced do not differ significantly from either of the other groups. Finally,
number of children is shown to have a significant relationship and is associated with 20%
greater odds of using such a service for every additional child reported by respondents.
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Table 10: Logistic Regression Analysis of Immigrants for Using a Rent-to-Own Service
Model 1
Model 2
Odds Ratio
SE Odds Ratio
SE
First Generation, From Developed Country
0.28*
(0.16)
0.39
(0.23)
First Generation, From Developing Country
1.08
(0.15)
0.71*
(0.10)
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country
0.54
(0.22)
0.44*
(0.18)
Education
Less than High School
5.33*** (0.93)
High School
3.42*** (0.55)
Some College
3.16*** (0.50)
College Degree or Higher
Employment Status
Employed
Unemployed
0.95
(0.11)
Not in the Labor Force
0.45*** (0.05)
Annual Income
0.98*** (0.00)
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Age
Male
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
Widowed/Separated/Divorced
Number of Children
N
34244
34244
Psuedo R-squared
0.00
0.07
Chi Squared
10.97
461.57
P-Value
0.01
0.00
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Model 3
Odds Ratio
SE
0.50
(0.29)
0.53*** (0.09)
0.25**
(0.11)
5.09***
3.40***
2.98***

(0.92)
(0.55)
(0.48)

0.74*
1.27
0.99***

(0.09)
(0.16)
(0.00)

1.54***
1.44*
1.33
1.94***
0.96***
0.74***

(0.17)
(0.21)
(0.45)
(0.33)
(0.00)
(0.06)

-

-

1.31*
(0.15)
1.23
(0.15)
1.20*** (0.04)
34244
0.12
729.41
0.00

Table 11: Logistic Regression Analysis of Immigrants for Taking Out an Auto Title Loan
Model 1
Model 2
Odds Ratio
SE Odds Ratio
SE
First Generation, From Developed Country
0.25*
(0.17)
0.30
(0.22)
First Generation, From Developing Country
1.14
(0.17)
0.88
(0.14)
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country
1.33
(0.41)
1.15
(0.36)
Education
Less than High School
3.16*** (0.57)
High School
2.35*** (0.35)
Some College
2.38*** (0.34)
College Degree or Higher
Employment Status
Employed
Unemployed
1.19
(0.16)
Not in the Labor Force
0.52*** (0.06)
Annual Income
1.00*** (0.00)
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Age
Male
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
Widowed/Separated/Divorced
Number of Children
N
34200
34200
Psuedo R-squared
0.00
0.03
Chi Squared
8.19
141.58
P-Value
0.04
0.00
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Model 3
Odds Ratio
SE
0.34
(0.24)
0.75
(0.15)
0.89
(0.30)
3.11***
2.34***
2.30***

(0.57)
(0.36)
(0.34)

1.07
0.95
1.00**

(0.15)
(0.14)
(0.00)

1.35*
1.13
1.19
1.11
0.97***
0.97

(0.19)
(0.20)
(0.39)
(0.27)
(0.00)
(0.09)

-

-

1.49**
(0.20)
1.70*** (0.25)
1.11*
(0.05)
34200
0.04
215.77
0.00

Auto Title Loan
Table 13 shows the results of analysis concerning taking out an auto title loan
within the last 12 months. As with the rent-to-own analysis, second-generation
immigrants whose parents are from a developed country created a zero-cell issue and
were removed from the regression model. Comparison of the immigrant categories will
thus be to citizens and these second-generation immigrants. In Model 1, only first65

generation immigrants from a developed country are significantly different and have 75%
lower odds of taking out an auto title loan.
In Model 2, no immigrant category was shown to be significantly different.
Taking education into account, those with less than high school have 216% greater odds
of taking out an auto title loan, those with a high school education have 135% greater
odds, and those with at least some college have 138% greater odds, all of which are
significant when compared to those with a college degree. In the context of employment
status, only those not in the labor force differ significantly from the employed and have
48% lower odds. Annual income is shown to have a significant relationship, but reports
an odds ratio of exactly 1.00, meaning there is no change in the odds of taking such a
loan based on annual income. This remains unchanged in Model 3.
In Model 3, no significant differences were observed between the immigrant
categories, even when considering all contrast categories (results for contrasts not
shown).
Compared to those with a college degree, all categories remain significantly
different, with those with less than high school having 211% greater odds of taking out an
auto title loan, those with a high school education having 134% greater odds, and those
with at least some college having 130% greater odds. When adjusting the reference
category to be those with less than high school, those with at least some college have
26% lower odds of taking out such a loan, which is significant (results not shown). No
other contrasts were significant.
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When it comes to employment, no significant differences were observed between
the analyzed categories, even when considering all contrasts (results not shown).
In the context of race, only significant difference was observed: when compared
to whites, Blacks have 35% greater odds of taking out an auto title loan. (No contrasts
significant, results not shown).
Age is shown to have a significant relationship with taking out an auto title loan
and is associated with having 3% lower odds for every year above the mean reported by
respondents. Sex is not significant in this analysis. Compared to those who have never
married, those who are married have 49% greater odds of taking out such a loan, and
those who are widowed, separated, or divorced have 70% greater odds. (No significant
contrasts; results not shown). Finally, number of children is shown to have a significant
relationship and is associated with 11% greater odds of taking out such a loan for every
additional child reported by respondents.

Discussion and Conclusion
The current study is an analysis of the economic integration of immigrants
through the lens of underbanking, or the practice of engaging with alternative financial
service such as payday lenders or pawn shops instead of traditional banking services. As
a particularly damaging financial practice, furthering our understanding on how
immigrants, an already vulnerable population, engage in this set of behaviors serves to
create a more comprehensive picture of the economic health of immigrants in the U.S.
Additionally, this study attempts to examine immigrants with more nuance than a
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Table 12: Underbanking Behaviors Regressions Summary Table for Model 3 (Continued on Next Page)
Unbanked
Odds Ratio
SE
First Generation, From Developed Country
0.57
(0.19)
First Generation, From Developing Country
1.26**
(0.11)
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
1.17
(0.35)
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country 0.51*** (0.09)
Education
Less than High School
5.48*** (0.58)
High School
3.01*** (0.30)
Some College
1.92*** (0.20)
College Degree or Higher
Employment Status
Employed
Unemployed
2.04*** (0.13)
Not in the Labor Force
1.47*** (0.11)
Annual Income
0.96*** (0.00)
Race
White
Black
3.32*** (0.21)
Hispanic
2.51*** (0.21)
Asian
0.87
(0.17)
Other
2.43*** (0.27)
Age
0.98*** (0.00)
Male
1.20*** (0.06)
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
0.59*** (0.04)
Widowed/Separated/Divorced
0.84*
(0.06)
Number of Children
1.19*** (0.03)
N
36220
Psuedo R-squared
0.30
Chi Squared
5160.58
P-Value
0.00
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Underbanked
Odds Ratio
SE
0.95
(0.11)
1.66*** (0.09)
0.76
(0.12)
0.71*** (0.07)
2.75***
1.74***
1.48***

Money Order
Odds Ratio
SE
0.91
(0.14)
1.14*
(0.07)
0.76
(0.16)
0.84
(0.10)

(0.13)
(0.07)
(0.05)

-

2.18***
1.71***
1.50***

(0.13)
(0.08)
(0.07)

-

(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.00)

3.01***
1.77***
1.01
2.11***
0.98***
1.00

(0.12)
(0.09)
(0.08)
(0.15)
(0.00)
(0.03)

-

(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.00)

3.46***
1.77***
0.82
2.13***
0.98***
0.91**

(0.15)
(0.11)
(0.10)
(0.17)
(0.00)
(0.03)
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(0.44)
(0.27)
(0.20)

0.77
0.89
1.00**

(0.13)
(0.18)
(0.00)

1.72*
1.18
0.64*
1.23
0.99
1.06

(0.38)
(0.23)
(0.13)
(0.42)
(0.01)
(0.13)

1.23**
0.88
0.99***

(0.08)
(0.06)
(0.00)

1.59***
1.34***
0.65*
1.94***
0.98***
1.07

(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.12)
(0.20)
(0.00)
(0.05)

-

0.86*** (0.04)
1.09
(0.05)
1.03
(0.02)
34297
0.11
3151.40
0.00

2.24***
1.62**
1.33
-

-

0.78*** (0.03)
0.98
(0.04)
1.09*** (0.02)
36220
0.13
5390.13
0.00

Int. Remittances
Odds Ratio
SE
0.91
(0.24)
2.09*** (0.35)
0.48
(0.41)
2.39**
(0.81)

(0.20)
(0.12)
(0.11)

1.04
0.99
0.99***

-

-

2.34***
1.79***
1.63***
-

1.27***
1.06
0.99***

Check-cashing
Odds Ratio
SE
0.97
(0.21)
1.10
(0.10)
0.93
(0.26)
0.74
(0.13)

0.81*** (0.05)
0.99
(0.07)
1.07**
(0.02)
34322
0.07
1119.74
0.00

1.12
0.94
1.06

(0.17)
(0.19)
(0.06)
1655
0.10
217.73
0.00

Table 12, Continued
Tax Refund Loan
Odds Ratio
SE
First Generation, From Developed Country
0.84
(0.27)
First Generation, From Developing Country
0.62**
(0.10)
Second Generation, Parents from Developed Country
0.62
(0.31)
Second Generation, Parents from Developing Country
0.73
(0.19)
Education
Less than High School
1.55**
(0.21)
High School
1.59*** (0.16)
Some College
1.31**
(0.13)
College Degree or Higher
Employment Status
Employed
Unemployed
1.03
(0.10)
Not in the Labor Force
0.70**
(0.08)
Annual Income
1.00*** (0.00)
Race
White
Black
1.57*** (0.15)
Hispanic
1.19
(0.16)
Asian
1.46
(0.33)
Other
1.53*
(0.25)
Age
0.99**
(0.00)
Male
0.89
(0.06)
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
0.77**
(0.07)
Widowed/Separated/Divorced
0.74**
(0.08)
Number of Children
1.19*** (0.04)
N
34194
Psuedo R-squared
0.04
Chi Squared
311.28
P-Value
0.00
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Payday Loan
Odds Ratio
SE
0.30
(0.22)
0.77
(0.13)
0.26
(0.26)
0.88
(0.25)
2.35***
2.06***
2.21***

Pawn Shop
Odds Ratio
SE
0.44
(0.26)
0.49***
(0.09)
0.44
(0.31)
0.63
(0.20)

(0.38)
(0.28)
(0.28)

-

2.31***
2.12***
1.90***

(0.38)
(0.29)
(0.26)

-

(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.00)

2.40***
1.60**
0.77
2.55***
0.98***
0.92

(0.25)
(0.24)
(0.28)
(0.42)
(0.00)
(0.08)

-

(0.18)
(0.15)
(0.00)

1.37**
1.49**
0.82
1.82***
0.97***
1.41***

(0.16)
(0.22)
(0.31)
(0.31)
(0.00)
(0.12)
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(0.57)
(0.36)
(0.34)

1.07
0.95
1.00**

(0.15)
(0.14)
(0.00)

1.35*
1.13
1.19
1.11
0.97***
0.97

(0.19)
(0.20)
(0.39)
(0.27)
(0.00)
(0.09)

0.74*
1.27
0.99***

(0.09)
(0.16)
(0.00)

1.54***
1.44*
1.33
1.94***
0.96***
0.74***

(0.17)
(0.21)
(0.45)
(0.33)
(0.00)
(0.06)

-

1.06
(0.12)
1.88***
(0.22)
1.09*
(0.04)
34311
0.09
595.63
0.00

3.11***
2.34***
2.30***
-

-

0.88
(0.10)
1.11
(0.13)
1.12**
(0.04)
34310
0.07
446.67
0.00

Auto Title Loan
Odds Ratio
SE
0.34
(0.24)
0.75
(0.15)
0.89
(0.30)

(0.92)
(0.55)
(0.48)

1.62***
1.17
0.99***

-

-

5.09***
3.40***
2.98***
-

0.82
0.72**
0.99***

Rent-to-own
Odds Ratio
SE
0.50
(0.29)
0.53*** (0.09)
0.25**
(0.11)

1.31*
(0.15)
1.23
(0.15)
1.20*** (0.04)
34244
0.12
729.41
0.00

1.49**
(0.20)
1.70*** (0.25)
1.11*
(0.05)
34200
0.04
215.77
0.00

citizen/non-citizen binary allows, by separating immigrants based on first- and secondgeneration status, as well as by the development status of their country of origin. This
study focuses its efforts through three hypotheses.
First, H1 predicts that first-generation immigrants from developing countries will
be the most likely to engage in underbanking than all other groups. As we can see from
the results, there is some strong support for this hypothesis: in terms of being both
unbanked and underbanked, first-generation immigrants experience substantially greater
odds. When it comes to individual underbanking behaviors, they experience greater odds
of using a money order within the 12 months. For most behaviors, however, there is no
difference between this group and citizens. There are some notable exceptions, however.
The odds of sending international remittances, for example, are greater than citizens, but
not as great as the odds for second-generation immigrants whose parents are from a
developing country, meaning they do not have the greatest odds of all groups.
Additionally, with rent-to-own services, Tax Refund Anticipation Loans, and pawn
shops, first-generation immigrants appear to be doing better than citizens. These results
will be discussed later.
Second, H2 predicts that second-generation immigrants from developing
countries would be more likely to engage in underbanking behavior than citizens, but not
as great as first-generation immigrants from developed countries. Surprisingly, the
opposite seems to be reported from these analyses, as only one category shows this group
as having greater odds than citizens: sending international remittances. In all other
analyses, this group is either statistically similar to citizens, or has significantly lower
odds. This implies that second-generation immigrants from developing countries are
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more like other second-generation immigrants than they are like other immigrants from
developing countries, in that they seem to share the better overall assimilation and
behavior convergence typical of second-generation immigrants. Like H1, exceptions are
rent-to-own services, pawn shops, and Tax Refund Anticipation Loans.
Finally, H3 suggests that first- and second-generation immigrants from developed
countries will be most similar to citizens than all other immigrant groups. This hypothesis
has the most support from the results of these analyses, as these immigrants do not ever
significantly differ from citizens. While this could be seen as a boon for these groups in
that they are not particularly affected, these results should not be taken to mean that
underbanking and AFS usage is lessened for them, only that it happens at the same rate at
which it happens to citizens.
General support for this study’s hypotheses fits concretely within explanations
offered from theoretical perspectives on assimilation and with prior research into
underbanking. These results show that there are still many barriers in place preventing the
convergence of financial behavior of immigrants and citizens proposed by assimilation
theories. Additionally, examining the difference based on country of origin reveals
compelling reason to see the starting line as being very different for immigrants from
developing countries, especially considering that those from developed countries never
significantly differ from citizens. Studies that do not take country of origin into account
are likely seeing results that can potentially mask the disparity for immigrants from
developing countries by including immigrants which this study shows are not suffering
the same barriers to financial assimilation. Unfortunately, first-generation immigrants
from developing countries, who already face systemic and structural issues in
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assimilation processes like racism, discrimination, language barriers, and many more, are
also experiencing greater odds of being exposed to the numerous potential harms of being
underbanked.
This agreement between present results and expectations from theory and
literature is also true for second-generation immigrants, who only experience greater odds
than citizens to engage in underbanking in the context of sending international
remittances, which is the logical extension of who would be most likely to use such a
service in the first place. The fact that even second-generation immigrants whose parents
are from a developing country have lower or equivalent odds than citizens to be
underbanked means that the barriers faced by first-generation immigrants are not
insurmountable for their children.
Notably, while first-generation immigrants from a developing country do worse
on being unbanked or underbanked, they do not differ from citizens when it comes to the
use of particularly harmful forms of AFS, namely payday loans and check-cashing
services. As discussed in prior sections of this study, these two forms inflict serious
financial damage upon those who are reliant upon them. The fact that immigrants in this
study are not disproportionately affected by them is not necessarily positive, however. It
must be remembered that this only means they are not significantly different from
citizens, who, this study would argue, still use these services too frequently. Put another
way, these services are still a problem for immigrants because they are a problem for
everyone.
The results for control variables also fall in line with expectations based on
theoretical understandings and prior research. Notably, education and race play a
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persistently large role in determining the odds of engaging in underbanking behaviors.
Race is a key influence, often returning the highest coefficients in these analyses.
Additionally, more education nearly always results in comparatively lower odds of being
underbanked or engaging in underbanking behaviors. The most notable exception is that
odds seem to be greater for those with some college than they are for those with a high
school education when it comes to taking out payday loans. One potential explanation is
that students who begin college but do not finish often struggle to pay student loans but
do not benefit from the higher pay a college degree typically brings and thus may turn to
things like payday loans as a result (Kolodner & Butrymowicz, 2017).
As noted above, the three behaviors which seem to move in the opposite direction
from what was predicted are rent-to-own services, Tax Refund Anticipation Loans and
pawn shop usage, all of which show immigrants as having lower odds than citizens and
seem to grow in statistical strength and significance as controls are added. The latter
effect is persistent across all controls; that is, no matter which control is added to the
regression model, the effect is observed (results not shown). This effect could be
potentially explained as a “suppression” effect, meaning there are strong, unaccounted for
relationships between the independent variables being used in this analysis (MacKinnon,
Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). However, as of this writing, the source of this suppression
effect is unidentified, and this pattern cannot be meaningfully explained. The former
effect, having lower odds than citizens, can be easily explained for Tax Refund
Anticipation Loans, since one must have both a job that collects taxes (as discussed
before, first-generation immigrants are less likely to have official income sources) and a
social security number to file for such a loan (which not all immigrants can obtain).
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Possible explanations for rent-to-own services are that using such a service may require
documentation like pay stubs or ID that these immigrants are less likely to possess, or the
service is so expensive, it is no longer within the realm of possibility. However, there
does not appear to be any obvious reason why this is true for pawn shops, especially
considering that prior research and common sense would reason that these immigrants
would be drawn to using such a service, both because it requires a different barrier to
entry than traditional banks or other forms of AFS and because it offers immediate cash
and anonymity (Paulson, Singer, Newberger, & Smith, 2006). Possible explanations are
that pawn shops are an aspect of AFS that are not common in their country of origin, and
are thus avoided due to unfamiliarity, or that, due to their increased likelihood of being in
poverty, they are less likely to possess items of sufficient value to be pawned.
Several limitations can be identified in this study. First, and likely most relevant,
is that this study was limited to participants of the CPS, which does not differentiate
between documented and undocumented foreign-born respondents (Passel, 2016). The
lack of this distinction is particularly troubling, given that the undocumented subset of the
immigrant population almost assuredly experiences much greater barriers to social and
financial inclusion. Beyond any obvious cultural and language issues, they would face a
lack of valid documentation and identification in opening an account and may fear
reprisal and deportation from the possession of an account leading to their discovery by
certain governmental organizations. While nationally-representative, generalizable
quantitative studies on this group would likely be extremely difficult, if not impossible, it
must be noted that the inability to examine them specifically means this study misses out
on what is likely the most vulnerable section of this vulnerable population.
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Second, it should also be noted that the mechanism used to measure underbanking
by the CPS and FDIC is likely to be oversensitive. Using any one of 8 forms of AFS a
single time within the last 12 months is too wide a net to cast, especially when there is no
recognition of the different financial picture of someone who took out an auto loan once,
and someone who uses payday loans every month to get by. The main issue is that the
definition operationalized by this survey does not include a measure of reliance on AFS.
A narrower definition of underbanking that includes the number of times respondents
used each service would likely better serve to create an accurate frame for who should be
included in this group, and who should not. To illuminate this point, consider the control
variable measuring annual income. When it comes to being underbanked, income is only
associated with 1% lower odds for every $1,000 above the mean. This means someone
making $20,000 more than the mean only has 20% lower odds of being underbanked,
which is a smaller change in odds than one might expect. This is likely explained by the
grouping together of everyone who uses any behavior a single time within 12 months: the
ability to measure amount of times a behavior is engaged in would likely reveal that
higher levels of income are associated with using AFS far less often.
Despite these limitations, the current study adds vital information to the growing
bodies of literature surrounding both the experiences of immigrant populations and
underbanking. First, this study provides detailed regression results not just for being
unbanked or underbanked, but for every potential avenue to be considered underbanked.
Literature on AFS detailed earlier explains how individual forms of underbanking affect
those reliant upon them in different ways, even if the various effects are all considered
negative. By examining not just if they are underbanked, but specifically how they are
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underbanked, we are granted a more accurate picture of which aspects of financial
assimilation immigrants are having a hard time navigating. These findings suggest that,
while certain immigrants are indeed more likely to be unbanked or underbanked, these
immigrants also tend to experience some of the worst underbanking behaviors, like
payday loans, only at the same rate as citizens, rather than having substantially greater
odds like prior research and conventional wisdom might lead one to assume.
Second, as noted by previous research, country-specific data is a valuable area of
advancement in this area of study (Chatterjee & Zahirovic-Herbert, 2012), and this paper
is the only known one to engage in such analysis. This study persuasively shows that the
experience of immigrants varies greatly depending on the type of country they and their
parents are from. This important difference allows us to understand the immigrant
population of this country as diverse and distinct, much in the same way our population
of non-immigrants is. Researchers should generalize about the immigrant population
without taking notice of the details of their immigration no more than they might
generalize about a non-immigrant population without taking notice of their race, sex, or
education.
In conclusion, this study has examined the harmful economic phenomenon of
underbanking and how it relates to immigrant populations in the U.S. As noted above,
underbanking is a particularly harmful practice, costing low-income families as much as
9.5% of their annual income, and correlatis with many other social ills, such as
unemployment, health risks, and social exclusion. Given the disadvantages already faced
by many of these immigrants, examining the rates at which they engage in these
behaviors allows for a deeper understanding of their financial assimilation experiences.
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Results of these analyses suggest that not all immigrants share a monolithic experience,
but that first-generation immigrants from developing countries still face substantially
higher rates of underbanking compared to other groups. Future research should not
overlook the potential differences between immigrants, based both on generational
effects and the development status of their country of origin.
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